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“My Computer Is My Castle”: New Privacy 
Frameworks to Regulate Police Hacking* 
Ivan Škorvánek,† Bert-Jaap Koops,‡ Bryce Clayton Newell,**  
and Andrew Roberts†† 
Several countries have recently introduced laws allowing the police to 
hack into suspects’ computers. Legislators recognize that police hacking is 
highly intrusive to personal privacy but consider it justified by the 
increased use of encryption and mobile computing—both of which 
challenge traditional investigative methods. Police hacking also 
exemplifies a major challenge to the way legal systems deal with, and 
conceptualize, privacy. Existing conceptualizations of privacy and privacy 
rights do not always adequately address the types and degrees of intrusion 
into individuals’ private lives that police hacking powers enable. 
Traditional privacy pillars such as the home and secrecy of 
communications do not always apply to computer-based police 
investigations in an era of mobile technologies and ubiquitous data. 
In this Article, we conduct a comparative legal analysis of criminal 
procedure rules in the United States, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
and the United Kingdom to see which privacy frameworks lawmakers and 
courts apply when regulating police hacking. We show that while classic 
privacy frames of inviolability of the home and secrecy of communications 
remain adequate for some forms of police hacking (observation and 
interception), they fail to capture novel and fundamentally different ways 
in which the most intrusive forms of police hacking (covert online searches 
and remote surveillance) impact privacy in twenty-first-century society. 
	
*   The research for this Article was made possible by a grant from the Netherlands 
Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO), project number 453-14-004. We thank Leo 
Nobile and Aldo Sghirinzetti for research assistance, and Nicolas von zur Mühlen for 
valuable help. All translations in this Article are by the authors, except where otherwise 
indicated. 
†   PhD Researcher, Tilburg Institute for Law, Technology, and Society (TILT), 
Tilburg University. 
‡   Professor of Regulation and Technology, Tilburg Institute for Law, Technology, 
and Society (TILT), Tilburg University, the Netherlands. 
**  Assistant Professor, School of Journalism and Communication, University of 
Oregon. 
††  Associate Professor, Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne. 
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Our analysis shows the emergence of two new frameworks that have the 
potential to begin filling this void: 1) a container-based approach, focusing 
on the computer as protection-worthy in itself—or the “informatic home;” 
and 2) a content-based approach, focusing on the protection of data—or 
“informatic privacy.” Since both approaches have valuable benefits and 
potential drawbacks, we propose that a complementary application of the 
two might work best to capitalize on their advantages over traditional 
privacy frameworks to regulate police hacking. 
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In recent years, lawmakers in several countries have introduced 
police hacking powers into their domestic law. Relatedly, scholars 
have noted that police use of malware is also becoming more 
common. These trends have been driven, at least in part, by two 
particular developments: 
The first concerns the fact that many communications services 
use end-to-end encryption, often by default, combined with the fact 
that these providers often do not fall within the scope of traditional 
wiretapping obligations1 (because they are over-the-top services 
rather than communications channel providers). This implies that 
traditional interception—which takes place somewhere along the 
line—has become useless when it comes to capturing the contents 
of communications.2 Relatedly, the increasing prevalence of hard-
disk encryption also contributes to these developments.3 
Frequently, investigators have still been able to identify IP 
addresses and other identifying information through, for example, 
regular use of peer-to-peer software clients4 or software capable of 
	
 1.  See Susan Hennessey, The Elephant in the Room: Addressing Child Exploitation and 
Going Dark, HOOVER INST. (2017), http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/ 
docs/hennessey_webreadypdf.pdf; Orin S. Kerr & Bruce Schneier, Encryption Workarounds, 
106 GEO. L.J. 989 (2018); Jonathan Mayer, Government Hacking, 127 YALE L.J. 570, 577, 578 n.28 
(2018); Stephanie K. Pell, You Can’t Always Get What You Want: How Will Law Enforcement Get 
What It Needs in a Post-CALEA, Cybersecurity-Centric Encryption Era?, 17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 599 
(2016); see also Paul Ohm, The Investigative Dynamics of the Use of Malware by Law Enforcement, 
26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 303, 303 (2017) (ascribing this position to the FBI as a primary 
justification for using malware). 
 2.  See, e.g., MIRJA GUTHEIL ET AL., LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR HACKING BY LAW 
ENFORCEMENT: IDENTIFICATION, EVALUATION AND COMPARISON OF PRACTICES 8 (Policy Dep’t 
for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs ed., 2017); Bundestag, Pro und Contra 
Staats-trojaner bei der Anhörung zur Strafrechts-reform, DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG (June 1, 2017) 
https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2017/kw22-pa-recht-strafrecht/ 
508168 (Ger.); Ustawa o Policji uzasadnienie [Explanatory Memorandum to the Police Act], 
KOMENDA GŁÓWNA POLICJI at 17-18, https://archiwumbip.mswia.gov.pl/download/4/ 
5283/Uzasadnienie.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2019) (Pol.); Kamerstukken II, 2015/16, 34 372, 
no. 3 at 7–10 (Neth.). 
 3.  Felix Freiling, Christoph Safferling & Christian Rückert, Quellen-TKÜ und  
Online-Durchsuchung als neue Maßnahmen für die Strafverfolgung: Rechtliche und  
technische Herausforderungen, 2018 JURISTISCHE RUNDSCH. 9, 19 (2018) (Ger.) (referring to full-
disk encryption). 
 4.  See, e.g., United States v. Gray, 641 F. App’x. 462, 464 (6th Cir. 2016); United States 
v. Ganoe, 538 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Blouin, No. CR16-307 TSZ, 2017 WL 
3485736, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 15, 2017) (“[Peer-to-peer scanning software] is not analogous 
to . . . [a] NIT [because] [i]t does not place any program on the target computer or give the 
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scanning torrent networks.5 However, when users move their illicit 
activities to the so-called “dark web,” utilizing privacy-protecting 
measures to avoid identification, successful investigation becomes 
much more difficult without the use of police hacking techniques. 
The second development is the increase in mobile computing—
notably, smartphones, laptops, and tablets—and cloud computing. 
This implies that traditional search-and-seizure powers are 
becoming less effective and less practical. Moreover, the rise of 
wireless networking, enabling broad access to the internet from 
many different access points, diminishes the usefulness of a 
wiretap on a specific access point. Often, the police will be aware of 
some logical address of a computer (e.g., an IP address) but not its 
physical location. The difficulty in locating a computer to be 
searched is compounded by anonymization techniques, such as 
onion routing, which obfuscate the source of communications or 
cyber-attacks. Police hacking is a useful way of countering this 
trend, since it enables the police to search computers remotely 
without having to know where they are physically located.6 
Together, these developments are frequently captured by 
statements that law enforcement is “going dark” or that they are 
being confronted with an otherwise unsurmountable “encryption 
problem.”7 As framed by former FBI Director James Comey, 
“Going Dark” means that, 
[t]hose charged with protecting our people aren’t always able to 
access the evidence we need to prosecute crime and prevent 
terrorism even with lawful authority. We have the legal authority 
to intercept and access communications and information 
pursuant to court order, but we often lack the technical ability to 
do so.8 
	
Government access to anything other than the items in the ‘shared’ folder, which are 
available to anyone using a similar peer-to-peer file-sharing program.”). 
 5.  See, e.g., United States v. Hoeffener, No. 4:16CR00374 JAR/PLC, 2017 WL 3676141, 
at *1 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 25, 2017). 
 6.  See, e.g., id. at *19 (discussing challenges of anonymization); Kamerstukken II, 
2015/16, 34 372, no. 3 at 10–13 (Neth.). 
 7.  Lex Gill, Tamir Israel & Christopher Parsons, Shining a Light on the Encryption 
Debate: A Canadian Field Guide 39, 51 (May 2018), https://christopher-parsons.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/Shining-A-Light-Encryption-CitLab-CIPPIC.pdf. 
 8.  James B. Comey, Going Dark: Are Technology, Privacy, and Public Safety on a Collision 
Course?, FBI.GOV (Oct. 16, 2014), https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/going-dark-are-
technology-privacy-and-public-safety-on-a-collision-course. 
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Comey means here that, while the FBI may still technically 
intercept data, these data are becoming meaningless (“dark”) 
because of the rise of encryption, both of “data in motion” 
(encrypted transmission) and of “data at rest” (encrypted storage).9 
As a consequence, the argument goes, allowing the police to 
covertly access computers remotely may well be the best way to 
enable law enforcement to retain the capacity to collect evidence. 
Remote covert access facilitates law enforcement in accessing data 
before they are encrypted (or after they are decrypted) or retrieving 
passwords used for the encryption, without resorting to cruder and 
(even) more contestable measures such as compulsory backdoors 
in communications services.10 
Against this backdrop, a surprising number of countries have 
introduced varying police hacking powers into their domestic law. 
Legislators in these countries generally recognize the (potential) 
intrusiveness of police hacking into individual lives and privacy 
but have determined that the risks inherent in “going dark” 
necessitated legislative action. Notably, police hacking powers vary 
considerably by jurisdiction, and because of the varying 
functionalities and scopes of hacking powers, there is considerable 
confusion about the ways and degrees in which these new powers 
(might) infringe fundamental rights. Police hacking is one of 
several developments that challenge the way legal systems deal 
with privacy: legal frameworks that use traditional notions of home 
and communications content as key pillars of privacy protection do 
not apply well to computer investigations in an era of mobile 
technologies and ubiquitous data.11 Instead, new frameworks seem 
to arise that may be better suited to contemporary digital 
investigations, based on the notion that computers, rather than or 
	
 9.  Id. 
 10.  See Bert-Jaap Koops & Eleni Kosta, Looking for Some Light Through the Lens of 
“Cryptowar” History: Policy Options for Law Enforcement Authorities Against “Going Dark,” 34 
COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 890 (2018) (“[L]egal hacking powers . . . could be the only 
realistic policy option to preserve some light in an era of dark communication channels”). 
 11.  See Bert-Jaap Koops, On Legal Boundaries, Technologies, and Collapsing Dimensions of 
Privacy, 3 POLITICA E SOCIETÀ 247 (2014) (discussing how current privacy frameworks are 
inadequate to regulate digital investigations); infra Section V.A; see also Bert-Jaap Koops, 
Bryce Clayton Newell, Tjerk Timan, Ivan Škorvánek, Tomislav Chokrevski & Maša Galič, A 
Typology of Privacy, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 483 (2017) (for an overview of the current pillars of 
privacy protection). 
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besides homes, should be people’s bastion of privacy protection: 
“my computer is my castle.”12 
In this Article, we identify and compare how five countries 
conceptualize the infringement of privacy in the context of police 
hacking. We examine what these varying approaches can tell us 
about the status and nature of privacy protections in the twenty-
first century. We conduct a comparative analysis of privacy 
protection within the procedural criminal law of five countries in 
which police hacking has been regulated and/or in which there has 
been interesting discussion about the issue: Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These 
jurisdictions were chosen based on their centrality to a larger, 
ongoing research project on protecting privacy in the twenty-first 
century and include a mix of common law and civil law 
jurisdictions. The broader methodological considerations driving 
this country selection have been outlined elsewhere.13 We analyze 
statutory and case law at the federal level in these countries to 
highlight the primary safeguards in the law; lower-level 
regulations and guidelines are beyond the scope of this Article. As 
we are interested in the rationale for imposing certain safeguards, 
we also analyze legislative histories and policy debates to 
determine which privacy frameworks have guided lawmakers to 
	
 12.  See also infra Section V.B; cf. Bert-Jaap Koops, Bryce Clayton Newell & Ivan 
Škorvánek, Location Tracking by Police: The Regulation of “Tireless and Absolute Surveillance,” 9 
U.C.I. L. REV. 635 (2019) (discussing new privacy paradigms emerging in the context of police 
location tracking); Michael D. Ricciuti & Kathleen D. Parker, My Phone Is My Castle: Supreme 
Court Decides that Cell Phones Seized Incident to Arrest Cannot Be Subject to Routine Warrantless 
Searches, 58 BOS. B.J. 7 (2014) (discussing cell phones as new object of privacy protection in 
the context of searches incident to arrest). 
 13.  See Koops et al., supra note 11, at 504–506. In this Article, we exclude the 
jurisdictions addressed in the larger project that lack regulation or substantial doctrinal 
literature on police hacking (Canada, Czech Republic, and Poland). In Canada, police 
hacking powers (often referred to as “lawful access” provisions) have “languished on the 
Canadian agenda” due to a series of unfavorable “federal elections and successful civil 
liberties opposition to the legislation, along with businesses’ resistance[.]” Christopher 
Parsons, Stuck on the Agenda: Drawing Lessons from the Stagnation of “Lawful Access” Legislation 
in Canada, in LAW, PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE IN CANADA IN THE POST-SNOWDEN ERA 261 
(Michael A. Geist ed., University of Ottawa Press 2015). In Poland, police hacking is not 
regulated in criminal procedure law, although a provision allowing covert access to data has 
been recently included in Art. 19(6) of the Police Act. Ustawa o Policji Art. 19(6) (1990 r. DZ. 
U. Nr 30, poz. 179) (Pol.). Nevertheless, the issue has not been taken up extensively in the 
domestic literature. In the Czech Republic, explicit regulation of police hacking does not 
exist, and we could not unearth any relevant sources showing that it is taking place under 
more general surveillance provisions, despite hints of it being so. 
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impose (or not impose) certain safeguards. Our Article is limited to 
hacking by law enforcement authorities; we leave aside hacking by 
intelligence agencies. 
The Article is structured as follows. In Part II, we explain what 
police hacking entails, in terms of the terminology involved, the 
ways in which police can hack into computers, and the goals or 
functionalities of such hacking. Part III gives a bird’s-eye overview 
of police hacking regulations in our five jurisdictions. We then 
analyze the regulation of police hacking in more detail in Part IV, 
discussing which safeguards apply to the different functionalities 
of police hacking. Part V focuses on the privacy paradigms that 
underlie these safeguards; we highlight to what extent lawmakers 
resort to classic privacy frames (such as protection of homes and 
communications content) to guide their stipulation of safeguards, 
and which new privacy frames are emerging in the regulation of 
police hacking. The Conclusion summarizes the main findings and 
provides an outlook on the traditional and new privacy frames 
used to regulate police hacking. 
I. BACKGROUND: POLICE HACKING 
A. Terminology 
Before examining how and where police hacking takes place, 
we need to explain the terminology used. Lawmakers and authors 
use an amazing variety of terms to refer to activities by law 
enforcement agencies that enable them to covertly access 
computers.14 A simple umbrella term is “police hacking”15—or, 
more generally (although it also includes hacking by security and 
intelligence agencies), “government hacking.”16 Similarly, some 
	
 14.  MARCO TORRE, IL CAPTATORE INFORMATICO. NUOVE TECNOLOGIE INVESTIGATIVE E 
RISPETTO DELLE REGOLE PROCESSUALI 12–13 (Milano, Giuffrè Editore 2017) (“[H]igh-court 
case-law uses terms such as ‘computer sensor’ and ‘intruding agent;’ doctrine prefers ‘online 
searches,’ ‘covert remote acquisition,’ spyware, atypical captures, Trojan horses and State 
viruses . . . In this contribution it seems preferable to use the expression ‘remote control 
systems’ (RCS).”) (internal references omitted); Mayer, supra note 1, at 575 n.16 
(“Government documents have referred to hacking with a wide variety of terms, including 
Network Investigative Technique (NIT), Computer and Internet Protocol Address Verifier 
(CIPAV), Internet Protocol Address Verifier (IPAV), Remote Access Search and Surveillance 
(RASS), Remote Computer Search, Remote Search, Web Bug, Sniffer, Computer Tracer, 
Internet Tracer, and Remote Computer Trace.”). 
 15.  GUTHEIL ET AL., supra note 2. 
 16.  Mayer, supra note 1 (using the term “government hacking”). 
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authors talk of “lawful hacking,” to distinguish the practice from 
criminal hacking.17 To avoid negative associations that the term 
“hacking” may trigger, however, governments tend to avoid the 
term altogether and instead try to use some suitably vague or 
technical-sounding term. In U.S. courts, the use of the term 
“malware” to describe authorized government hacking activities 
has also occasionally proven controversial, with at least one federal 
district court noting that the term, as defined in Black’s Law 
Dictionary,18 was not necessarily appropriate “[d]ue to the negative 
connotations associated with the word.”19 Additionally, U.K. law 
speaks of “Computer Network Exploitation” or “Equipment 
Interference,”20 while in the United States, the term “Network 
Investigative Techniques” (NITs) is frequently used.21 The  
Dutch lawmaker has used the overly broad term “investigation in 
a computer” (onderzoek in een geautomatiseerd werk) as a label for 
police hacking.22 
Rather than using an umbrella term, however, we can also refer 
to police hacking based on the particular target or aims behind the 
activity. Thus, when police hacking aims to copy stored data, it 
might be called an “online search” (in Germany: online-
	
 17.  Steven M. Bellovin, Matt Blaze, Sandy Clark & Susan Landau, Lawful Hacking: 
Using Existing Vulnerabilities for Wiretapping on the Internet, 12 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1 
(2014). 
 18.  Black’s Law Dictionary considers “malware” slang, and forwards readers to 
“malicious technology,” which is defined as “[a]ny electronic or mechanical means, esp. 
software, used to monitor or gain access to another’s computer system without authorization 
for the purpose of impairing or disabling the system. Examples of malicious technology are 
Trojan horses, time-outs, keystroke logging, and data-scrambling devices.” Malicious 
Technology, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 19.  United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, at 601–02 (E.D. Va. 2016). But see 
United States v. Werdene, 883 F.3d 204, 208 (3rd Cir. 2018) (“The FBI’s solution was the NIT, 
a form of government-created malware that allowed the FBI to retrieve identifying 
information from Playpen users located all around the world.”); United States v. Workman, 
863 F.3d 1313, 1315 (10th Cir. 2017) (“[I]n this case, the FBI seized and assumed control, using 
malware to identify and find the individuals accessing child pornography”). 
 20.  See U.K. HOME OFFICE, EQUIPMENT INTERFERENCE: CODE OF PRACTICE (March 
2018), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ 
attachment_data/file/715479/Equipment_Interference_Code_of_Practice.pdf [hereinafter 
Code of Practice]. 
 21.  Orin S. Kerr & Sean D. Murphy, Government Hacking to Light the Dark Web: What 
Risks to International Relations and International Law?, 70 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 58, 59 (2017). 
 22.  Artikel 126nba SV (Neth.). 
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Durchsuchung23; in Italy: perquisizione online24), and when it is 
targeted at intercepting communications, it might be called “source 
telecommunications surveillance” (in Germany, Quellen-
Telekommunikations Überwachung25) or simply “interception” as in 
the United States.26 Frequently, police hacking is also referred to in 
terms of the primary tool used: malware or “policeware,”27 “State 
viruses,”28 “State Trojans” or “federal Trojans,”29 or “intruder 
agents.”30 In Italy, the most commonly used term to indicate police 
hacking is “computer sensor” (captatore informatico).31 
Where the hacking is limited to specific functionalities, such as 
the remote and covert search of a hard disk, more specific terms 
such as “online search” can be used. Such usage requires care, 
however: a “search” in criminal law typically refers to a one-off 
activity focused on accessing existing (stored) data; in contrast, an 
“online search,” for instance in the German context, encompasses 
not merely a one-off search of existing data but also real-time 
collection of data generated during the period of execution, making 
the term “online search” rather misleading.32 Similarly, using 
“policeware” or “State Trojans” can be too narrow if, beyond 
purely remote searches, the investigatory conduct can also take the 
form of physically installing a keylogger on a computer or logging 
in to someone’s account with a phished or intercepted password. 
In this Article, we use the term “police hacking,” for purposes 
of convenience, as an umbrella term that encompasses the broad 
	
 23.  Freiling et al., supra note 3, at 18. 
 24.  Federica Iovene, Le c.d. perquisizioni online tra nuovi diritti fondamentali ed esigenze 
di accertamento penale, 4 DIRITTO PENALE CONTEMPORANEO, nos. 3–4, 2014, at 331. 
 25.  Stephan Beukelmann, Online-Durchsuchung und Quellen-TKÜ, 13 NEUE 
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT SPEZIAL 440, 440 (2017) (Ger.). 
 26.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2)–(4) (2012) (referring to “interception” and defining 
“intercept” in the context of accessing electronic and oral communications). 
 27.  Bart Jacobs, Policeware, 39 NEDERLANDS JURISTENBLAD 2761 (2012). 
 28.  Cass. Pen., sez. VI, 26 maggio 2015, n. 27100, CED Cass. 2015 (“Musumeci”) (It.). 
 29.  Dennis-Kenji Kipker, Vom Staatstrojaner zum staatseigenen Bundestrojaner, 49 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSPOLITIK 88, 88 (2016). A “Trojan” is a piece of malware (malicious 
software) that sneakily nestles itself on a computer, invisibly for the user, and opens a 
backdoor that enables someone with knowledge of this backdoor to covertly access the 
computer and remotely take control of it. See, e.g., What Is a Trojan? Is It a Virus or Is It 
Malware?, NORTON (last visited Feb. 17, 2020) https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-
malware-what-is-a-trojan.html (explaining how “Trojans” work). 
 30.  Cass. Pen., sez. VI, 26 maggio 2015, n. 27100 (“Musumeci”). 
 31.  C.p.p. Art. 266(2) (Ita.); TORRE, supra note 14. 
 32.  Freiling et al., supra note 3, at 13. 
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array of possible police powers and methods that police might use 
to covertly access computers for purposes of criminal investigation. 
In contrast to euphemisms that serve as a rhetorical tool to 
downplay or obfuscate the intrusiveness of the measure, such as 
“Network Investigative Techniques” or “investigation in a 
computer,” the term “hacking” clearly pinpoints the core of this 
investigation measure: non-consensual access to a computer. This 
umbrella term has the benefit of encompassing all forms of access—
both physical and remote—and all kinds of tools or modes  
of access. 
B. Modes of Hacking 
Police hacking can be done in different ways.33 The main tool 
for police hacking is malware, which can be installed on (or 
delivered to) a target computer in three ways. The first and most 
direct form is to install malware when the police have physical 
access to a computer, for instance, by covertly entering a dwelling 
to install a keylogger onto a computer34 or uploading the software 
at a border check.35 Social engineering might sometimes work to 
trick the targeted user into, for example, inserting an infected USB 
stick into their computer.36 
Because physical access is often not possible, the second basic 
form is more common: remotely infecting the computer with 
malware. This happens largely in the same way as cybercriminals 
deploy malware, namely, to send a message to a target computer 
user and use social engineering to trick the user into opening an 
attachment or clicking on a link, which will then covertly install  
the malware.37 
	
 33.  See, e.g., Code of Practice, supra note 20, ¶¶ 3.2–3.3 (discussing various modes of 
police hacking). 
 34.  TORRE, supra note 14, at 16. 
 35.  Tanja Niedernhuber, Die StPO-Reform 2017 – wichtige Änderungen im Überblick, 50 
JURISTISCHE ARBEITSBLÄTTER 169, 171 (2018). 
 36.  Giuseppe Vaciago & David Silva Ramalho, Online Searches and Online Surveillance: 
The Use of Trojans and Other Types of Malware as Means of Obtaining Evidence in Criminal 
Proceedings, 13 DIGITAL EVIDENCE & ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE L. REV. 88, 89 (2016). 
 37.  See, e.g., OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S 
IMPERSONATION OF A JOURNALIST IN A CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION (Sept. 2016), 
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/o1607.pdf; JÜRGEN-PETER GRAF, STPO § 100B ONLINE-
DURCHSUCHUNG BECKOK STPO MIT RISTBV UND MISTRA Rn. 27 (Graf ed., 31 ed. 2018); 
TORRE, supra note 14, at 15; Mayer, supra note 1, at 574–76, 583–84. 
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As with criminal malware, the infection of someone’s computer 
with policeware is an extremely far-reaching measure. It basically 
enables police to take remote control without the computer user’s 
knowledge, allowing copying, transmitting, altering, or removing 
data, turning on the webcam and microphone, etc. Hackers speak 
of this level of user rights in terms of “I own you,” and the idea of 
law enforcement agencies “owning” someone might well be seen 
as “deeply disturbing.”38 
A third and less intrusive form of police hacking is covertly 
accessing a computer using the user’s username and password. 
These credentials might be obtained through phishing and other 
forms of social engineering, by using software to guess 
passwords,39 or they may perhaps have been found during a 
regular search or through interception. Hacking into a computer or 
cloud service using lawfully obtained credentials also allows 
searching all the user’s data, but it does not enable remote control 
to the extent that malware infections do. 
C. Functionalities of Hacking 
Police hacking and policeware can serve many purposes. These 
techniques have been called a “Swiss army knife”40 and a “bulimic 
device,”41 emphasizing the multi-purpose nature of police hacking. 
These metaphors carry the connotations of a likely tendency of the 
tool to include ever more purposes (with so many nifty gadgets that 
the original function—cutting—is lost from sight), thriving on an 
insatiable hunger for ever more data. As Parts III and IV will show, 
most jurisdictions allow some functionalities of police hacking but 
not others, or they apply different conditions to the various 
functionalities. It is therefore important to distinguish the precise 
functionalities that laws on police hacking—in general or in specific 
cases—allow. 
	
 38.  Jacobs, supra note 27, at 2762. 
 39.  Kamerstukken II, 2015/16, 34 372, no. 3 at 34 (Neth.). 
 40.  BERT-JAAP KOOPS, CHARLOTTE CONINGS & FRANK VERBRUGGEN, ZOEKEN IN 
COMPUTERS NAAR NEDERLANDS EN BELGISCH RECHT 61 (Wolf Legal Publishers 2016). 
 41.  Luigi Palmieri, La nuova disciplina del captatore informatico tra esigenze investigative e 
salvaguardia dei diritti fondamentali. Dalla sentenza “Scurato” alla riforma sulle intercettazioni, 8 
DIRITTO PENALE CONTEMPORANEO, no. 1, 2018 at 59, 60 (quoting Leonardo Filippi, L’ispe-
perqui-intercettazione “itinerante”: le Sezioni unite azzeccano la diagnosi ma sbagliano la terapia, IL 
PENALISTA (Sept. 6, 2016), http://ilpenalista.it/articoli/news/lispe-perqui-intercettazione-
itinerante-le-sezioni-unite-azzeccano-la-diagnosi-ma). 
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We make Dutch law our starting point for providing an 
overview of possible functionalities, since it has the most  
extensive list.42 Police hacking can, in principle, be used for the 
following purposes: 
A. Capturing specific types of data. This is the 
least intrusive form, focusing only on acquiring 
certain data needed for the investigation. Dutch 
law gives as examples of this functionality the 
capture of identifying information (to establish 
who uses the computer) or the location of the 
computer (and thereby, the user). It might be 
seen as a digital sneak-and-peek operation.43 
B. Remote search of stored data. This involves the 
remote and covert search of existing data, stored 
on the infected target computer or stored on a 
service provider’s server (possibly in the cloud). 
The search may be targeted at certain data or 
may involve making a mirror image of the hard 
disk. This is functionally equivalent to a 
traditional search of a place, such as a dwelling, 
and the seizure or mirror-imaging of computers 
found during the search, but a crucial difference 
is that the hacking-based remote search is covert: 
it remains unknown to the persons affected by 
the search. It shares, however, the characteristics 
of the traditional search in being a one-off search 
of existing data, which distinguishes it from the 
following functionality: remote monitoring.44 
C. Remote monitoring of computer use. This is 
one of the most comprehensive functionalities, 
enabling the capture of data that come into 
	
 42.  See infra Section III.C. In addition to these, TORRE, supra note 14, at 18, also 
mentions “circumventing commercial anti-virus software” as a functionality of police 
hacking, but we consider this a system requirement of policeware rather than a purpose in 
itself. 
 43.  Kamerstukken II, 2015/16, 34 372, no. 3 at 20 (Neth.). 
 44.  Dutch law treats the functionalities of a remote search (B) and remote monitoring 
(C) together as a single purpose, but we distinguish them as two separate functions to 
emphasize the important dogmatic difference between searching existing data (one-off and 
backward-looking) and monitoring computer use (periodic and forward-looking). Artikel 
126nba(1)(d) SV (Neth.). 
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existence after the malware infection during a 
certain period. It can take the form of a repeated 
remote search at certain intervals (e.g., at the end 
of each day searching for newly stored data) or 
real-time monitoring (e.g., using the keylogger 
function to transmit in real-time what the user 
types or clicks). This can be combined with 
taking screenshots or screencasting. Thus, this 
functionality has a hybrid character. On the one 
hand, it can resemble a (repeated) search, 
focusing on acquiring stored data, with the 
atypical element that it is not only targeted at 
historic data but also at data that will come into 
existence after the order for hacking has been 
given. On the other hand, it can resemble real-
time surveillance, virtually an equivalent of an 
invisible police officer looking over a person’s 
shoulder at whatever they do with their 
computer. 
D. Intercepting communications. With this 
functionality, policeware is used as an 
alternative means of (or as a way to implement) 
intercepting communications. As with 
traditional interception, there are two different 
modalities. 
1. Intercepting electronic communications, 
such as email, texting, chatting, Skyping, 
or FaceTiming. Since most of these 
services nowadays use end-to-end 
encryption, and interception through the 
service provider is often not possible,45 
	
 45.  Full-throated end-to-end encryption makes it impossible for the service provider 
to access (or grant access to) the plaintext of encrypted communications. Voice-over-Internet-
Protocol (VoIP) providers are subject to lawful access provisions such as those of the 
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) in the United States. See 
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and Broadband Access and Services, 
71 Fed. Reg. 38091-01 (July 5, 2006) (FCC final rule establishing guidelines for VoIP services’ 
compliance with CALEA); Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act and 
Broadband Access and Services, 20 FCC. Rcd. 14989 (Sept. 23, 2005) (FCC order classifying 
VoIP services as subject to CALEA’s requirements). However, such obligations do not apply 
to other types of online communications tools (e.g., messaging or chat apps) that are equally 
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interception at the source before 
encryption (or at the destination after 
decryption) may be the only way to 
capture the contents of online 
communications. 
2. Intercepting oral communications. This 
can be done by, e.g., using the malware 
to turn on the computer’s microphone, 
which enables recording the sounds and 
conversations taking place with, or in the 
vicinity of, the device. Here, hacking 
functions as a means to implement oral 
interception, similar to placing a bug in a 
computer or other object in use by the 
suspect. 
E. Visual observation. This functionality is served 
by turning on the computer’s webcam, which 
can be used to identify the user or the 
computer’s location, or to observe the behavior 
of the user or people in its environment. Here, 
police hacking is a functional equivalent to 
installing a hidden camera in the  
suspect’s environment. 
F. Remotely deleting (unlawful) data. This 
functionality—only encountered in Dutch law—
enables the police to remotely remove or delete 
unlawful data, such as child pornography or 
botnet infection software, from a targeted 
computer. It complements the functionality of a 
remote search, so that, similarly to situations of 
a traditional search,46 police can remove 
unlawful data they find on a hard disk (or in an 
account) from the suspect’s control. It also might 
	
or even more popular than voice communications. Besides scope issues, there are also 
jurisdictional problems when providers do not fall under national (CALEA-resembling) 
legislation; see, e.g., Kamerstukken II, 2015/16, 34 372, no. 3 at 9 (Neth.). 
 46.  Cf. Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, art. 19(3)(d), Nov. 23, 2001, S. 
TREATY DOC. NO. 108–11, E.T.S. No. 185 (requiring Parties to adopt measures to seize or 
similarly secure computer data, including the power to “render inaccessible or remove those 
computer data in the accessed computer system”). 
003.NEWELL_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/17/20 12:39 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2019 
1012 
	
enable the police to remotely disinfect 
computers that have fallen victim to a botnet, 
although such interference with the computers 
of non-suspects would be highly controversial. 
As is clear from this list, police hacking is quite varied in nature. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to classify the different purposes into 
two main categories: (1) search and (2) surveillance.47 This 
grouping matches a classic distinction in criminal investigation 
powers, namely between investigations that are generally overt 
and backward-looking (i.e., looking for existing evidence)—as in 
search and seizure powers—and investigations that are generally 
covert and forward-looking (i.e., looking for evidence yet to come 
into existence)—through the special investigation powers of 
surveillance. Functionalities A, B and F (and perhaps part of C), can 
be classified in the category of search, while the functionalities of 
C, D and E fall within the category of surveillance. 
II. BROAD OVERVIEW OF LAWS ON POLICE HACKING 
Since the different functionalities of police hacking are usually 
covered by the same (or a small number of) provisions in the 
procedural criminal law in each of the countries we studied, we first 
give a high-level overview of the most relevant provisions for each 
country. This overview introduces the main provisions regulating 
police hacking powers, the functionalities allowed, and the main 
safeguards placed on the exercise of this power, including the 
authorization requirements, types of offenses for which police 
hacking is allowed, necessity requirements, temporal limitations, 
and other safeguards, where relevant. 
A. Germany 
In Germany, police hacking has until recently only been 
regulated in various federal and state-level police laws in the 
context of preventive police activities. Only recently has the Code 
of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung, hereafter: German 
CCP) been amended to provide a legal basis for police hacking for 
	
 47.  TORRE, supra note 14, at 18–19 (citing Roberto Flor, Brevi riflessioni a margine della 
sentenza del Bundesverfassungsgericht sulla c.d. Online Durchsuchung, 22 RIV. TRIM. DIR. PEN. EC. 
695, 697 et seq. (2009)). 
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criminal investigation in Sections 100a and 100b of the German 
CCP. The way in which the amendment came about has been 
criticized in literature48 as well as by the experts invited to the 
parliamentary expert hearing.49 The amendment was inserted into 
the draft of the Criminal Procedure reform rather late in the 
legislative process and the bill was adopted only five weeks later. 
This meant that a proper parliamentary and societal debate about 
the proposed, and highly intrusive, investigation measures could 
not be conducted.50 
German regulation of police hacking is split into two 
provisions. Section 100a regulates the so-called source interception 
of telecommunications (Quellen-TKŰ) and Section 100b regulates 
the so-called online search (Online-Durchsuchung), which is subject 
to considerably stricter procedural safeguards. The origin of the 
split can be traced back to the landmark decision of the Federal 
Constitutional Court from February 27, 2008,51 which interpreted 
the German Basic Law as protecting the right to integrity and 
confidentiality of computer systems. This new right especially 
protects citizens from covert interventions into their computers and 
can only be restricted in extremely selective circumstances. 
However, as an exception, if such covert intervention is restricted 
to obtaining the content or metadata of ongoing communications, 
the protection of integrity and confidentiality of computer systems 
does not apply and the less-weighty requirements of constitutional 
protection of communications must be observed. This distinction 
allowed the legislature to regulate source interception of 
communications as a special form of police hacking, essentially an 
extension of the existing telecommunications interception powers. 
Thus, Section 100a of the German CCP (regulating the 
monitoring and recording of telecommunications) was 
supplemented to provide a legal basis for the source interception  
of telecommunications: 
	
 48.  Beukelmann, supra note 25, at 440; Freiling et al., supra note 3, at 9–10; Tobias 
Singelnstein & Benjamin Derin, Singelnstein/Derin: Das Gesetz zur effektiveren und 
praxistauglicheren Ausgestaltung des Strafverfahrens, 37 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHR. 2646, 
2646 (2017). 
 49.  Bundestag, supra note 2. 
 50.  Singelnstein & Derin, supra note 48, at 2646. 
 51.  BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07, Feb. 27, 2008 (Ger.). 
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The monitoring and recording of telecommunications may also be 
carried out by intervening with technical means in information 
technology systems used by the data subject, if this is necessary, 
to enable monitoring and recording, in particular in unencrypted 
form. Content and circumstances of the communication stored on 
the information technology system of the person concerned may 
be monitored and recorded, if they could have been monitored 
and recorded in encrypted form in the public telecommunication 
network during the current transmission process.52 
Section 100a, therefore, allows two functionalities of police 
hacking: 1) monitoring and recording ongoing telecommunications 
and 2) obtaining stored data if the data relate to past 
telecommunications that could have been monitored under the 
existing judicial order. The latter functionality seems to go beyond 
the limitation to ongoing telecommunications imposed by the 
Federal Constitutional Court and should arguably find its legal 
basis in Section 100b. 
While Section 100a merely extends the existing powers of 
interception of communications, Section 100b enters completely 
new territory, differing not so much in the means by which 
interception is conducted, but by the extent of the data which can 
be collected.53 Section 100b reads: 
Even without the knowledge of the person concerned, technical 
means may be used to intervene in an information technology 
system used by the data subject and data may be collected 
therefrom (online search) . . . . 
This provision gives law enforcement a potentially very wide 
access to data in information systems, including not only past data, 
but also future data that become available in the duration of a police 
hacking measure. Unlike the measure under Section 100a, past data 
available to the investigators also include data originating from 
before the ordering of the measure. However, according to the 
prevalent opinion in doctrinal literature, the measure does not 
permit independent generation of data by the investigators or 
making changes to the data. Therefore, police are not allowed, for 
	
 52.  STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [StPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], § 100a(1) (Ger.). 
 53.  Fredrik Roggan, Die strafprozessuale Quellen-TKÜ und Online-Durchsuchung: 
Elektronische Überwachungsmaßnahmen mit Risiken für Beschuldigte und die Allgemeinheit, 12 
STV - STRAFVERTEIDIGER 821, 825 (2017). 
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instance, to secretly turn on the camera or the microphone, or to 
delete unlawful data from the information system.54 
Authorization requirements for both measures are regulated in 
Section 100e of the German CCP. Source interception of 
telecommunications under Section 100a must be ordered by a court 
upon request of the public prosecutor. The measure may be 
ordered by the public prosecutor in case of imminent danger (of 
losing evidence), provided a court confirms the claim of imminent 
danger within three working days. The order is valid for three 
months, which can be extended as long as the conditions of the 
order persist. 
The so-called online search under Section 100b may only be 
ordered by the chamber of a Landgericht (mid-level district court). 
In case of imminent danger, the chamber’s chairman may order the 
measure, but the chamber must confirm it within three working 
days. This order is limited to a maximum of one month, although it 
can be extended; any extension beyond a total of six months must 
be decided by the Higher Regional Court. 
Both measures are restricted to a particular set of criminal 
offenses, where the act is especially serious in the individual case 
and hacking is considered necessary. Source telecommunications 
interception can be ordered if there are particular grounds to 
suspect a perpetrator has committed a serious crime or, where 
punishable, attempted or prepared to commit such an act. The same 
standard of suspicion is required for ordering an online search, but 
this is further restricted to particularly serious crimes, which 
nevertheless comprise a rather extensive list of not only violent 
offenses but also particularly serious economic crimes. Police 
hacking thus becomes a tool available for a significantly broader set 
of activities than under various other police laws, where it is limited 
to counter-terrorism activities.55 Both measures may only be 
ordered if the determination of the facts or the whereabouts of the 
perpetrator could not otherwise be obtained, and may only target 
the suspect or persons who communicate with the accused or use 
the same devices. 
	
 54.  Singelnstein & Derin, supra note 48, at 2467; see also Niedernhuber, supra note 35, 
at 172. 
 55.  See, for example, § 49 Bundeskriminalamtgesetz (Ger.), which permits police 
hacking in order to protect the body, life and freedom of persons, or such public goods on 
which the foundations of the state or human existence depend. 
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A further limitation, particular to the German legal system, are 
the requirements for the protection of the core area of private life 
(Kernbereich privater Lebensgestaltung), which guarantees a highly 
private sphere that is free from surveillance in order to protect 
human dignity. This sphere consists of inner processes, such as 
impressions and feelings, as well as reflections, views, and 
experiences of a highly personal nature.56 The core area is relevant 
both during data collection (avoiding intrusion as much as 
possible) and during data analysis and use (minimizing the 
intrusion by excluding all accidentally collected data that fall into 
the core area).57 As data relevant to the core area cannot  
be adequately excluded during data collection, safeguards must  
be put in place at the levels of analysis and use, such as using  
an independent examiner to screen the information and filter  
out information relevant to the core area prior to making  
the information available to the investigating law  
enforcement authority.58 
B. Italy 
Police hacking is generally discussed under the moniker of 
“informatic sensors” (captatori informatici). Sometimes these 
“sensors” are referred to as “state viruses” (virus di Stato), inspired 
by the German Bundestrojaner. The use of hacking for remote 
searches is usually referred to as an “online search” (perquisizione 
online). Although the technique appears to be massively used in 
practice, it is largely unregulated and there are relatively few court 
cases on its lawfulness as an investigation power or on the use of 
resulting evidence.59 Only one proposal, regulating the 
functionality of oral interception, has so far been successful in the 
legislature, despite a number of efforts to regulate covert online 
investigations.60 The under-regulation of police hacking is severely 
criticized in doctrinal literature, given that it is used in practice  
	
 56.  Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 20, 2016, 
1 BvR 966/09, Rn. 120–21 (Ger.). 
 57.  Id. at Rn. 216–17. 
 58.  Id. at Rn. 220. 
 59.  Vaciago & Ramalho, supra note 36, at 91. 
 60.  See the overviews in id. at 92–93 and Cass., sez. un., 28 aprile 2016, n. 26889, Arch. 
nuova proc. pen. 2017, 76, § 2 (“Scurato”) (It.). The situation with respect to covert online 
investigations has not changed since 2016. 
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but without specific safeguards associated with constitutional 
privacy protection.61 
Nevertheless, Italian courts have been rather permissive in 
allowing various applications of police hacking under existing legal 
provisions. Covertly installing a device on a computer to acquire 
files stored on it was held by the Italian Supreme Court to be 
governed by article 189 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure 
(Italian CCP) (atypical means of searching for evidence), for which 
a motivated order from the Public Prosecutor suffices.62 In contrast, 
in the 2012 Ryanair case, the Italian Supreme Court ruled out using 
a Trojan to monitor data flows to and from a computer on the basis 
of traditional search and seizure powers.63 In the realm of electronic 
communications interception, the Italian Supreme Court in 
Occhionero found that there was no general principle disallowing 
the use of Trojans under interception provisions.64 
The use of Trojans for intercepting communications, 
particularly oral interception through turning on the computer’s 
microphone, has triggered more case law. In Bisignani, the 
investigatory judge authorized this practice on the basis of article 
266(2) of the Italian CCP (interception of oral communications).65 In 
Musumeci, the Italian Supreme Court found that installing spyware 
(programma spia) on a portable device that turned on the 
microphone was a form of oral interception and that this can only 
take place “in clearly circumscribed places, identified at the outset, 
and not wherever the subject might be.”66 However, this  
judgment was overturned in 2016 by the United Sections of the 
Italian Supreme Court in Scurato,67 which held that such use of  
	
 61.  See Iovene, supra note 24, at 341; Palmieri, supra note 41, at 60, 65–66. 
 62.  Cass., sez. V, 14 ottobre 2009, n. 16556, CED Cassazione (“Virruso”) (It.), confirmed 
in Cass., sez. VI, 27 novembre 2012, n. 254865 (“Bisignani”) (It.); see also Vaciagio & Ramalho, 
supra note 36, at 92. 
 63.  TORRE, supra note 14, at 48. 
 64.  Cass., sez. V, 20 ottobre 2017, n. 15512 (“Occhionero”) (It.). See also Carola Frediani, 
Trojan per intercettazioni nelle indagini, via libera dalla Cassazione, LA STAMPA (Oct. 25, 2017), 
http://www.lastampa.it/2017/10/25/italia/trojan-per-intercettazioni-nelle-indagini-via-
libera-dalla-cassazione-R0jMpFvJJZAq33P4a9oZII/pagina.html. 
 64.  Cass., sez. V, 20 ottobre 2017, n. 15512 (“Occhionero”) (It.). 
 65.  Cass., sez. VI, 27 novembre 2012, n. 254865 (“Bisignani”) (It.). 
 66.  Cass., sez. VI, 26 maggio 2015, n. 27100 (“Musumeci”) (It.). 
 67.  Cass., sez. un., 28 aprile 2016, n. 26889 (“Scurato”) (It.). 
003.NEWELL_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/17/20 12:39 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2019 
1018 
	
a Trojan is effectively never permissible except in  
organized-crime investigations.68 
In statutory law, only the use of Trojans for oral interception 
targeting mobile devices has been specifically regulated. In 2017, a 
law was passed to amend article 266(2) of the Italian CCP so that 
oral interception (in Italian terms: interception of communications 
“between people present”) can also be conducted by inserting an 
informatic sensor on a mobile electronic device.69 An investigative 
judge must authorize the measure upon a prosecutor’s request. The 
decree authorizing the hacking must articulate why this measure is 
necessary, as well as—if the crime is not one of the statutorily 
enumerated serious crimes—”the places and the time, also 
indirectly determined, in relation to which the activation of the 
microphone is permitted.”70 
C. The Netherlands 
Until recently, the police power to access computers remotely 
and covertly was very limited in the Netherlands.71 Police could 
covertly access computers in two specific situations,72 but only to 
intercept communications, not to search the (data stored on a) 
computer. In June 2018, however, a law was passed to enable legal 
hacking. The Computer Crime III Act (Wet computercriminaliteit III), 
which entered into force on March 1, 2019, introduced legal hacking 
as a special investigatory power in the Dutch Code of Criminal 
Procedure (Dutch CCP).73 
The provisions introduced by the Computer Crime III Act 
involve a far-reaching and broad set of powers combined within 
one single provision. The basic idea is that computers can be 
covertly accessed remotely, in order to perform a variety of follow-
	
 68.  Id. at §§ 6–7. For a more detailed discussion of the Italian case law, see infra Part IV. 
 69.  Decreto Legge 29 dicembre 2017, n.216, G.U. Nov. 1, 2018, n.8 (It.). Note that the 
law’s entry into effect has been postponed to March 2019. 
 70.  C.p.p. Art. 267(1) (It.). 
 71.  Bert-Jaap Koops & Jan-Jaap Oerlemans, Formeel strafrecht en ICT, in STRAFRECHT EN 
ICT 117, 175 (Bert-Jaap Koops & Jan-Jaap Oerlemans eds., 2019). 
 72.  One situation is entering a dwelling to place a bug for oral interception; the other 
is accessing a computer as a technical means to execute an order for intercepting 
telecommunications. See Bert-Jaap Koops, Criminal Investigation and Privacy in Dutch Law 17, 
38 (TILT L. & Tech. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 21, 2016), http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2837483. 
 73.  See Stb. 2018, 322 (Neth.) (Act); Stb. 2019, 67 (Neth.) (entry into force). 
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up investigatory activities. These follow-up activities (which thus 
indicate the purposes for which remote covert access is allowed) 
are exhaustively mentioned in article 126nba(1) of the Dutch CCP: 
A. Determining certain characteristics (especially 
the identity or location) of the computer or the 
user. 
B. Recording confidential communications (both 
telecommunications and oral interception). 
C. Systematically observing where the remote 
access facilitates observation.74 
D. Securing data (both data stored on the computer 
and data that enter the computer after the 
remote access) for the period authorized in the 
order. 
E. Rendering data inaccessible, for example to 
delete unlawful data from the user’s computer 
(usually after copying the data for evidential 
purposes). 
This power can be applied for a period of four weeks, which can 
be prolonged repeatedly, each time for an additional four weeks. 
This requires authorization from an investigatory judge and from 
the Council of Procurators-General after advice from a technical-
legal advisory body (Central Examination Committee).75 The 
power can be used for investigating serious crimes: remote access 
for the goals mentioned under A, B, and C is possible for pre-trial 
detention crimes (generally, crimes carrying a maximum of at least 
four years’ imprisonment) that seriously breach the rule of law; 
access for the goals mentioned under D and E is only possible for 
crimes carrying a maximum penalty of at least eight years’ 
imprisonment and for specially designated felonies.76 
Only computers “in use with the suspect”77 can be investigated 
remotely. Depending on the circumstances, this might include the 
laptop or smartphone of the suspect’s co-inhabitants, friends, or 
	
 74.  Art. 126g, SV (Neth.). 
 75.  Kamerstukken II, 2015/16, 34 372, no. 3 at 37. 
 76.  This particularly involves felonies where “there is often no other clue” than to use 
the present power, such as botnet infections, child pornography, grooming, and other 
computer-related crimes. Kamerstukken II, 2015/16, 34 372, no. 3 at 29. 
 77.  Art. 126nba(1), SV (Neth.). 
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relatives, if the suspect (more or less regularly, e.g., more than just 
once or twice) uses these devices. 
Various safeguards are in place to regulate this method of legal 
hacking. For example, the order should specify the way the power 
is to be used and, for prolongation of use, the investigatory judge 
must give renewed authorization. The software used for remotely 
infecting computers should also conform to certain technical 
requirements.78 Furthermore, the power is to be executed by 
specifically designated technical investigation officers, while the 
collected data will be analyzed by officers investigating the case; 
this functional separation between technical and tactical 
investigation officers79 is an important safeguard because it 
prevents the primary investigating officers from having unlimited 
technical access to all the collected data. Afterwards, the software 
used should, in principle, be removed from the user’s computer 
unless that is too difficult or risky; in the latter case, the infected 
computer’s administrator should be notified so that they can (try 
to) remove the software on their own.80 Also, relevant  
subjects (betrokkenen) should be notified, unless this jeopardizes  
the investigation.81 
D. United Kingdom 
The framework that regulates interference with computers and 
other electronic devices (“equipment interference”) in the United 
Kingdom is found in a set of relatively complex provisions that 
together comprise Part 5 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 
(IPA). This part of the Act is supplemented by a statutory Code of 
Practice (Code).82 The Code is intended to be read in conjunction 
with the primary legislation and provides guidance to public 
authorities responsible for authorizing interference.83 Unlike any 
	
 78.  Kamerstukken II, 2015/16, 34 372, no. 3 at 31. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Art. 126nba(6), SV (Neth.). 
 81.  Art. 126bb, SV (Neth.). 
 82.  Code of Practice, supra note 21. Section 241 and Schedule 7 of the Investigatory 
Powers Act 2016, c. 25, § 272, sch. 10 (Eng.) require the Secretary of State to issue codes of 
practice about the exercise of powers and functions conferred by the Act. 
 83.  Such codes have become an increasingly common means of regulating 
investigatory powers in the United Kingdom. They have an unusual legal status. The 
requirement to issue them is usually set out in the primary legislation that confers the 
investigatory powers to which they relate, but the codes themselves do not constitute 
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internal guidance that might be published by public bodies 
exercising powers to interfere with equipment, the Code is a 
significant legal instrument extending to some 140 pages. 
The Code’s preamble states that its provisions are admissible as 
evidence in any civil or criminal proceedings, and that any court or 
tribunal considering such proceedings “may take the provision of 
the codes of practice into account.”84 Courts have taken breaches of 
codes of practice regulating more traditional investigatory powers 
into account in determining the admissibility of evidence.85 If, as 
appears to be the case, the Code relating to equipment  
interference enjoys a similar status, breaches of its provisions might 
also affect the admissibility of evidence acquired through 
equipment interference. 
The powers conferred by the IPA are very broad. In contrast to 
traditional warrants for the search of physical premises, which are 
judicially issued, equipment interference warrants are issued by the 
chief officer of a police area. Judicial oversight is maintained, 
however, by the requirement—except in urgent cases—that a chief 
police officer’s decision to issue a warrant be approved by a Judicial 
Commissioner.86 A warrant will either authorize or require the 
persons to whom it is addressed to secure interference with any 
“equipment” for the purpose of obtaining communications, 
equipment data, or any other information. “Equipment” is defined 
in very broad terms, as “any equipment producing 
electromagnetic, acoustic, or other emissions, or any device capable 
of being used in connection with such equipment.”87 Any device 
with components powered by an electrical charge will generate 
electromagnetic emissions. The Code provides as examples 
“desktop computers, laptops, tablets, smartphones, other internet-
	
primary legislation. Nevertheless, codes for traditional investigatory powers have been the 
subject of the kind of interpretive inquiry usually reserved for primary legislation. See, for 
example, Regina v. Forbes [2001] UKHL 40 (U.K.), in which the House of Lords—at the time, 
the highest appellate court in England and Wales—had to determine whether a literal or 
purposive approach to construing the words of a key provision of the code of practice on 
identification procedures was required. 
 84.  Code of Practice, supra note 21. 
 85.  In criminal trials, judges have broad discretion to exclude prosecution evidence 
where its reception would have an adverse effect on the fairness of the trial. See Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984, c. 60, § 78 (Eng.). 
 86.  Investigatory Powers Act 2016 § 106(1)(d) (U.K.). 
 87.  Id. § 135(1). 
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enabled or networked devices and any other devices capable of 
being used in connection with such equipment. Cables, wires and 
storage devices (such as USB storage devices, CDs or hard disks 
[sic] drives).”88 
Any interference authorized by a warrant must be for the 
purpose of obtaining “communications,” “equipment data,” or 
“any other information.”89 Clearly, there is no significant restriction 
here. The concept of a “communication” is very broad. It includes 
any files containing speech, music, sounds visual images “or data 
of any description.”90 “Equipment data” is defined in terms that 
encompass not only information about email and IP addresses, but 
any data that can be used to identify or assist in identifying any 
person, event, or the location of events and people.91 Some forms of 
equipment interference—taking control of a computer and tracking 
keystrokes or activating a webcam, for example—make it possible 
to monitor, observe, or listen to a person’s communications, and to 
record anything that is seen, heard, or discovered. 
The potential scope of an equipment interference warrant also 
depends on the number of devices covered by the warrant. The IPA 
envisages warrants of varying scope, and the Code refers to two 
categories. The first, a non-thematic warrant, is narrower and 
authorizes interference with equipment belonging to a particular 
person or organization, or with equipment at a particular location. 
The second category, a thematic warrant, will be considerably 
broader, as it relates to equipment that is linked by a common 
theme; it may “cover a wide range of activity, cover a wide 
geographical area, or involve the acquisition of a significant  
volume of data.”92 An interference warrant will be valid initially for 
six months and can subsequently be renewed for an additional  
six months. 
The United Kingdom’s statutory regime for equipment 
interference not only enables hacking by police themselves; it also 
confers power to co-opt communications providers in this 
endeavor by serving the warrant on any person who may be able 
to provide assistance—telecommunications operators, for example. 
	
 88.  Code of Practice, supra note 20, ¶ 2.2. 
 89.  Investigatory Powers Act 2016 § 99(2). 
 90.  Id. § 135(1). 
 91.  Id. §§ 263(2)–(3). 
 92.  Code of Practice, supra note 20, ¶ 5.12. 
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The Code suggests that law enforcement officers should attempt to 
work co-operatively with those who might provide assistance, but 
they have a power—subject to approval by the U.K. Secretary of 
State—to “impose a duty” to assist.93 The Code also explains that 
the assistance sought will usually be the provision of infrastructure 
(though no indication is given as to the nature of such 
infrastructure) or information about the technical specification of 
relevant equipment. 
The concept of privacy is central to the structure and rationale 
of the legislation. Section 1 of the IPA explains that the purpose of 
the legislation, generally, is “to set out the extent to which certain 
investigatory powers may be used to interfere with privacy.”94 
Section 2 of the IPA requires those issuing and renewing warrants 
to have regard to several broad considerations: 
A. whether what is sought to be achieved by the 
warrant, authorization, or notice could 
reasonably be achieved by other less intrusive 
means, 
B. whether the level of protection to be applied in 
relation to any obtaining of information by 
virtue of the warrant, authorization, or notice is 
higher because of the particular sensitivity of 
that information,95 
C. the public interest in the integrity and security of 
telecommunication systems and postal services, 
and 
D. any other aspects of the public’s interest in the 
protection of privacy.96 
Section 1 goes on to state that protections for privacy can be 
found in various parts of the IPA. The part that regulates 
equipment interference requires the person issuing a warrant—the 
chief police officer—to justify the application in terms that mirror 
	
 93.  Investigatory Powers Act 2016 § 128; Code of Practice, supra note 20, ¶¶ 7.4, 7.9. 
 94.  Investigatory Powers Act 2016 § 1(1). 
 95.  Section 2(5) and sch. 7 para. 2(4), state that ‘sensitive information’ includes items 
that are subject to legal privilege, information that might identify the source of journalistic 
information, and information held in confidence by a member of a professional community, 
e.g., medical records. 
 96.  Investigatory Powers Act 2016 §§ 2(2)(a)-(d). 
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the justificatory grounds for interference with the right to privacy 
under Article 8(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
The chief police officer must consider the warrant necessary for 
preventing or detecting serious crime97 and proportionate to the 
purpose of the interference.98 In relation to proportionality, the 
Code explains that, in considering whether this condition is met, 
the following should be considered: 
A. the extent of the proposed interference with 
privacy balanced against what is sought to be 
achieved; 
B. how and why the methods to be adopted will 
cause the least possible interference with the 
privacy of the person and others; 
C. whether the activity is an appropriate use of the 
IPA and a reasonable way, having considered all 
reasonable alternatives, of achieving what is 
sought to be achieved; 
D. what other methods, where appropriate, were 
either not implemented or have been employed 
but are assessed as insufficient to fulfil 
operational objectives without the use of the 
proposed investigatory power; 
E. whether there are any implications of the 
conduct authorized by the warrant for the 
privacy and security of other users of equipment 
and systems, including the internet, and an 
explanation of why (if relevant) it is nevertheless 
proportionate to proceed with the operation.99 
There are further protections for privacy in the form of a 
condition that limits the collection, copying, and dissemination of 
information and material that is necessary for a number of 
purposes prescribed in the IPA.100 The legislation also sets out 
	
 97.  A “serious crime” is defined in § 263(1) of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 as 
one for which a person aged 18 or over who “has no previous convictions could 
reasonably . . . expect[] to be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of [three] years or more, 
or . . . [which] involves the use of violence, results in substantial financial gain, or is conduct 
by a large number of persons in pursuit of a common purpose.” Id. § 263(1). 
 98.  Id. §§ 106(1)(a)–(b). 
 99.  Code of Practice, supra note 20, at ¶ 4.20. 
 100.  Investigatory Powers Act 2016 § 129. 
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specific protections in relation to material that is subject to legal 
privilege,101 confidential journalistic material,102 information that 
identifies the sources of journalistic material,103 and 
communications sent by or intended for members of the legislature 
and the private information of such persons.104 
The U.K. legislation neither prescribes nor proscribes any 
particular form of equipment interference. An equipment 
interference warrant will specify the object of the warrant—
equipment controlled by a particular person, installed at particular 
locations, forming part of a network, etc.—but will not impose 
conditions relating to the particular functionality of interference. 
The legislation merely states that the “obtaining of communication 
or other information” that is authorized includes “monitoring, 
observing or listening to a person’s communications or other 
activities.”105 A warrant authorizes “any conduct which it is 
necessary to undertake to do what is expressly authorized or 
required by the warrant.”106 The Code of Practice explains that 
equipment interference warrants authorize both physical 
interference with equipment and remote interference.107 Thus, the 
U.K. legislation authorizes, prima facie, each of the forms of 
hacking functionalities dealt with in the next Part of this Article.108 
However, the requirement that those issuing interference warrants 
consider the necessity and proportionality of the authorization 
sought might act as a constraint on the form and functionality of 
authorized interference. The Code of Practice explains that 
proportionality, on which the issue of a warrant depends, will not 
be met if the material that is sought could be obtained by less 
intrusive means. An assessment of proportionality requires 
consideration of “how and why the methods to be adopted will 
cause the least possible interference with the privacy of the person 
and others.”109 
	
 101.  Id. § 112. 
 102.  Id. § 113. 
 103.  Id. § 114. 
 104.  Id. § 111. 
 105.  Id. § 99(4)(a). 
 106.  Id. § 99(5)(a). 
 107.  Code of Practice, supra note 20, ¶ 3.11. 
 108.  See infra Part IV. 
 109.  Code of Practice, supra note 20, ¶ 4.20. 
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E. United States 
In the United States, scholars have begun to address police 
malware—frequently referred to as a “network investigative 
technique”110 (NIT) or “government hacking”111—in a variety of 
contexts. Several federal courts have addressed government 
hacking questions, most notably since 2016.112 Most of these cases 
stem from FBI deployment of malware as part of two major online 
sting operations beginning in 2011113 and 2014,114 although another 
major investigation of twenty-three additional hidden websites 
was also mounted in 2013.115 However, there is clear evidence that 
the FBI has been using malware to support its investigations since 
at least 2001.116 These investigations have led to criminal charges 
not just in the United States, but also in other countries.117 
In the earliest known judicial decision involving hacking by the 
FBI, the FBI physically installed a keylogger onto a suspect’s 
	
 110.  See, e.g., United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 592 (E.D. Va. 2016); Kerr & 
Murphy, supra note 21, at 59 n.7 (referring to NITs as presumably referring to “software used 
to bypass security features controlling access to a computer”). 
 111.  Kerr & Murphy, supra note 21, at 58;  Mayer, supra note 1, at 580; Ohm, supra note 
1, at 304. 
 112.  Mayer, supra note 1, at 578 (“Through 2015, there were only a few federal opinions 
on the practice. In 2016 and 2017, there were nearly a hundred . . . .”). 
 113.  See, e.g., United States v. Welch, 811 F.3d 275, 276 (8th Cir. 2016). 
 114.  United States v. Horton, 863 F.3d 1041, 1045 (8th Cir. 2017); see also Ohm, supra note 
1, at 304 (describing the Playpen investigation). 
 115.  Affidavit in Support of Application for a Search Warrant, In re Search of Computs. 
that Access “Websites 1–23”, No. 8:13-mj-01744-WGC (D. Md. July 22, 2013); Affidavit in 
Support of Application of Search Warrant, In re Search of Computs. that Access “Websites 
1–23”, No. 8:13-mj-01744-WGC (D. Md. Oct. 31, 2016) (hereinafter In re Search, 2016 
affidavit). 
 116.  See Mayer, supra note 1, at 575–76 (citing United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 
572, 574 (D.N.J. 2001)) (“The earliest reported case is from 2001, when FBI agents snuck into 
a mafioso’s office and installed a system for recording keystrokes.”); see also OFF. OF THE 
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S IMPERSONATION OF A 
JOURNALIST IN A CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION (Sept. 2016), https://oig.justice.gov/ 
reports/2016/o1607.pdf (detailing the FBI’s use of malware to identify the source of bomb 
threats to a school in the summer of 2007). The Electronic Frontier Foundation also released 
FBI documents pertaining to government use of malware referred to as a “web bug” or 
“Computer and Internet Protocol Address Verifier” (CIPAV). See Endpoint Surveillance Tools 
(CIPAV), ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/cases/foia-endpoint-
surveillance-tools-cipav (last visited Feb. 17, 2020). 
 117.  Joseph Cox, Child Porn Sting Goes Global: FBI Hacked Computers in Denmark, Greece, 
Chile, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 22, 2016, 12:01 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_ 
us/article/qkj8q3/child-porn-sting-goes-global-fbi-hacked-computers-in-denmark-greece-
chile; Ohm, supra note 1, at 303. 
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computer in an effort to discover the suspect’s passwords.118 In 
another pre-2012 investigation, FBI agents posed as journalists, 
writing a fake Associated Press article and sending a link to the 
suspect’s social media account.119 When the suspect clicked the link, 
his computer was infected with malware, reporting his IP address 
to the FBI.120 In the 2013 “Freedom Hosting” investigation, the FBI 
took control of a Tor hidden service (named “Freedom Hosting”) 
to deliver malware to specific users under a warrant that 
authorized them to access the following information: IP address, 
operating system, whether the NIT had already been delivered to 
the computer, host name, and MAC address.121 
Generally, the FBI has relied on the authority of Rule 41 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to apply for judicial warrants 
authorizing their deployment of NITs.122 However, according to 
one recent analysis, 
about half of the district courts that have considered the issue 
have—surprisingly—concluded that law enforcement hacking is 
not necessarily a Fourth Amendment search, and that the most 
common configuration of government malware is exempt from ex 
ante judicial supervision.123 
Prior to 2016, defendants would challenge these warrants, 
arguing that magistrate judges in other districts did not have 
jurisdiction to issue warrants covering searches outside their 
districts (i.e., in other parts of the country).124 However, effective 
December 1, 2016, Rule 41 was amended to explicitly allow 
magistrate judges “with authority in any district where activities 
related to a crime may have occurred” to issue warrants 
encompassing the use of malware or “remote access” software “to 
	
 118.  Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 574. 
 119.  OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 16;  Mayer, supra note 1, 574–76. 
 120.  OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 16. 
 121.  In re Search, 2016 affidavit, supra note 115 at 89–90; Mayer, supra note 1, at 588. 
 122.  Indeed, as noted by one scholar, “It is not apparent whether federal law 
enforcement agents have ever deployed malware without obtaining a search warrant.” 
Mayer, supra note 1, at 599. 
 123.  Id. at 582. 
 124.  However, federal courts frequently held that suppression of the evidence obtained 
through use of the malware in these cases was not necessary, even when the searches 
violated the Fourth Amendment, under the exclusionary rule or the good faith exception 
established in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920 (1984), and United States v. Jones, 230 
F. Supp. 3d 819, 823 (S.D. Ohio 2017). 
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search electronic storage media and to seize or copy electronically 
stored information located within or outside that district if . . . the 
district where the media or information is located has been 
concealed through technological means.”125 (The 2016 amendments 
also allow a single magistrate judge to authorize the search of 
computers located in “five or more districts”126 that have been 
damaged by malware (e.g., in cases of “botnets”) in violation of the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(5)). 
In the dark web context—or whenever police do not know the 
location or identity of a device or suspect (when investigatory 
techniques are being used to identify the device’s or data’s location 
and ownership)—the “government’s best chance of identifying 
who is behind the crime and where he is requires tricking the target 
into downloading malicious code.”127 This has led, for example, the 
FBI to seek warrants authorizing them to remotely install software 
onto target computers that has 
the capacity to search the computer’s hard drive, random access 
memory, and other storage media; to activate the computer’s 
built-in camera; to generate latitude and longitude coordinates for 
the computer’s location; and to transmit the extracted data to FBI 
agents.128 
As of November 5, 2018, there were seventeen federal appellate 
court decisions involving a “network investigative technique”, as 
well as numerous federal trial court decisions in hundreds of 
different individual prosecutions.129 All of these decisions arose 
within the context of just two federal child pornography 
investigations, “Operation Torpedo” (2011–12) and  
“Operation Pacifier” (2014–15), both part of the Department of 
	
 125.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6). 
 126.  Id. 41(b)(6)(B). 
 127.  Kerr & Murphy, supra note 21, at 59. 
 128.  In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d 
753, 755 (S.D. Tex. 2013). 
 129.  We have identified 102 of these cases through a manual search and reading of 
federal cases in Westlaw using the search terms: [adv: “network investigative technique”], 
[adv: “Website A” & FBI & 2015], [adv: “child pornography” & (playpen OR “play pen” OR 
pedobook OR pedoboard)], [adv: “child pornography” & NIT], and [adv: NIT & FBI]. See also 
Mayer, supra note 1, at 578 (“Through 2015, there were only a few federal opinions on the 
practice. In 2016 and 2017, there were nearly a hundred . . . .”). 
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Justice’s “Project Safe Childhood Initiative.”130 Of the seventeen 
appellate decisions, thirteen arose from the FBI’s investigation into 
a popular child pornography website within the Tor network 
(upf45jv3bziuctml.onion, or “Playpen”) as part of Operation 
Pacifier. The remaining four appellate cases stemmed from 
Operation Torpedo, involving the investigation of other dark web 
sites (including “PedoBoard” and “PedoBook”). 
Aside from the investigations into PedoBoard/PedoBook and 
in the Scarfo and In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises 
Unknown cases, all other reported cases noted above appear to have 
involved government hacking operations limited to functionality A 
(described supra, in Section II.C)—that is, capturing specific types of 
data, largely limited to information useful in identifying and 
locating computers allegedly associated with accessing or 
distributing child pornography. In Scarfo131 and the 
PedoBoard/PedoBook investigation, the installation of a keylogger 
presents an example of functionality D.1, or intercepting online 
communications—specifically, any typed commands inputted by the 
computer’s user (and, in the PedoBoard/PedoBook investigation, 
the issued warrants also extended to capturing various other forms 
of online communication). 
In the In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises 
Unknown132 case, the FBI’s intended (but not authorized) hacking 
activities extended to basically all functionalities A through E. The 
judge ruling on the FBI’s warrant application denied the warrant 
because it did not 1) meet the particularity requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment,133 or 2) meet the heightened requirements for 
warrants authorizing video surveillance.134 The court noted that 
video surveillance was “a potentially indiscriminate and most 
	
 130.  Project Safe Childhood, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/psc (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2020). 
 131.  United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572 (D.N.J. 2001). 
 132.  958 F. Supp. 2d 753. 
 133.  Id. at 758–59. The judge so found for the following reasons: 1) “The Government’s 
application contains little or no explanation of how the Target Computer will be found,” and 
2) “The Government’s application offers nothing but indirect and conclusory assurance that 
its search technique will avoid infecting innocent computers or devices.” Id. 
 134.  Id. at 759–61 (elaborating on the requirements for video surveillance warrants 
within the Fifth Circuit). 
003.NEWELL_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/17/20 12:39 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2019 
1030 
	
intrusive method of surveillance,” requiring additional safeguards 
under Fifth Circuit precedent.135 
Federal courts have issued contradictory opinions about the 
applicability of the Fourth Amendment in many of these cases, 
particularly those involving only the capture of specific types of 
data about a computer and its location (functionality A). While the 
delivery and execution stages in the malware utilization process 
may also implicate the Fourth Amendment in some circumstances, 
the bigger question is whether the exploitation (electronic access to 
a suspect’s device) or reporting (sending information back to the 
government) stages ought to implicate Fourth Amendment 
concerns.136 Importantly, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that 
merely touching a suspect’s physical property can constitute a 
Fourth Amendment search, and some circuit courts have 
analogized these physical “closed container” searches to those 
conducted of electronic devices.137 On the other hand, metadata,138 
which is essentially the type of information obtained under 
functionality A, is generally not protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.139 Hence, 
[l]aw enforcement hacking thus poses a Fourth Amendment 
conundrum. It shares a key feature of physical device searches: 
	
 135.  Id. at 759–60 (quoting United States v. Cuevas–Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 250 (5th Cir. 
1987)). 
 136.  Mayer, supra note 1, at 589 (“If there is any constitutional privacy  
protection associated with this form of malware, it must reside in the exploitation and 
reporting steps.”). 
 137.  Id. at 590–92; see United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 718–19 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[I]t 
seems natural that computers should fall into the same category as suitcases, footlockers, or 
other personal items that command a high degree of privacy.”) (internal quotation and 
citation omitted); see also United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(“Individuals generally possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in their home 
computers.”); Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402–04 (4th Cir. 2001); Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 
325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 138.  Bryce Clayton Newell, The Massive Metadata Machine: Liberty, Power, and Secret 
Mass Surveillance in the U.S. and Europe, 10 ISJLP 481, 487–88 (2014) (“Metadata . . . 
includes . . . information about the time, duration, and location of a communication as well 
as the phone numbers or email addresses of the sending and receiving parties. It also may 
include information about the device used, for example, the make/model and specific device 
identification number.”). 
 139.  See id. at 492–93 (discussing limited privacy protections for non-content 
information under the Fourth Amendment). An exception is cell-site location data held by a 
wireless service provider, which has received Fourth Amendment protection. See Carpenter 
v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). Possibly, the Supreme Court may craft other future 
exceptions to the general rule that metadata does not acquire Constitutional protections. 
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the government obtains data directly from the suspect’s device. 
But it also shares key features of compelling data from a service 
provider: there is no physical contact with the suspect’s property, 
and the data that the government obtains can be conceptually 
divided into content and metadata categories.140 
Mayer has argued that law enforcement “unambiguously 
engage[s] in a Fourth Amendment search” when it delivers 
malware to a suspect’s device because it “involves law enforcement 
officers physically interacting with a suspect’s device,” or, 
separately, when a piece of malware captures and “transmits the 
contents of a communication or a file.”141 However, in most 
functionality A cases, at least those dealing with the capture of 
information like IP addresses, it is not clear that either of these 
conclusions would apply.142 With this limited functionality, has the 
device been touched or accessed by law enforcement? 
III. HACKING FUNCTIONALITIES AND PRIVACY INTERESTS 
In this Part, we discuss how lawmakers and courts have framed 
the privacy interest(s) at issue when allowing certain functionalities 
of police hacking for investigatory purposes. What were 
lawmakers’ primary concerns, and which constitutionally 
guaranteed privacy types, if any, did they apply? Does legislative 
history indicate whether lawmakers felt that existing constitutional 
frameworks sufficiently addressed the intrusiveness of police 
hacking? In the sections that follow, we examine how privacy 
considerations have arisen in connection to the functionalities of 
police hacking identified above in Section II.C.143 
A. Capturing Specific Types of Data 
Some of the jurisdictions we studied regulate the capture of 
certain specific types of data separately from, or differently than, 
more comprehensive data searches. This is perhaps based on the 
	
 140.  Mayer, supra note 1, at 594. 
 141.  Id. at 594–95. 
 142.  Id. at 596 (“Courts have consistently held that an IP address is constitutionally 
unprotected metadata, much like a telephone number.”). 
 143.  We will not discuss functionality F—remotely deleting unlawful data—since this 
is only encountered in Dutch law and involves risks for the integrity and availability of 
computer data rather than privacy risks to confidentiality of data. 
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idea that such targeted use of police hacking powers, limited to 
specific types of data necessary for an investigation, is less intrusive 
than more comprehensive access to various types of data. 
This distinction is seen in the content/non-content distinction 
in U.S. Fourth Amendment law (although, as discussed above, 
police hacking does challenge this general rule). If the application 
is to acquire non-content (metadata) information about electronic 
or wire communications, the federal Pen Registers and Trap and 
Trace Devices chapter of Title 18144 (the “Pen/Trap Statute”) 
applies, providing statutory rules that govern in place of the 
standard Rule 41 warrant requirements. A pen-register order 
allows law enforcement to acquire “dialing, routing, addressing, or 
signaling information,”145 while a trap-and-trace order allows them 
to capture “incoming electronic or other impulses which identify 
the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and 
signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a 
wire or electronic communication.”146 Neither of these orders can 
authorize the collection of the “contents of any communication.”147 
In practice, it appears the FBI may have (at least at one time) settled 
on a two-part process for deploying what has been referred to as a 
Computer and Internal Protocol Address Verifier (CIPAV) in 
conjunction with additional measures designed to collect 
additional information, acquiring an initial “search warrant to 
authorize intrusion into the computer” followed by an application 
for an order under the Pen/Trap Statute “to authorize the 
surveillance done by the spyware.”148 
FBI hacking techniques often implicate this functionality 
(capturing specific types of information). In the PedoBook/PedoBoard 
cases,149 FBI agents had taken control of an illicit child pornography 
site and had inserted malware into the code of the site that would 
infect users’ computers and instruct them to report the “user’s IP 
	
 144.  18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–27 (2018). 
 145.  Id. § 3127(3). 
 146.  Id. § 3127(4). 
 147.  Id. § 3127(3)–(4). 
 148.  Jennifer Lynch, New FBI Documents Provide Details on Government’s Surveillance 
Spyware, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 29, 2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/ 
2011/04/new-fbi-documents-show-depth-government. 
 149.  United States v. Huyck, 849 F.3d 432 (8th Cir. 2017); United States v. Cottom, 679 
F. App’x 518 (8th Cir. 2017); United States v. DeFoggi, 839 F.3d 701 (8th Cir. 2016); United 
States v. Welch, 811 F.3d 275 (8th Cir. 2016). 
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address, the date and time the user accessed the content, and his or 
her computer’s operating system.”150 The technique used by the FBI 
exploited the user’s computer by exploiting a vulnerability within 
the Adobe Flash plugin.151 In investigating the creator of the site, 
Aaron McGrath, the FBI also acquired a warrant allowing them to 
install keylogging software in order to “allow law enforcement to 
obtain the passwords and pass-phrases necessary to access 
McGrath’s computers as well as the electronic files stored on those 
computers and to access communications between McGrath and 
others currently unknown to law enforcement.”152 Subsequently, 
the FBI obtained additional warrants allowing them to intercept 
private messages and other electronic communications sent 
through the hidden service for as long as needed to “fully reveal” 
the “identity of the target subjects or information that may be useful 
in establishing their identity.”153 
In the Playpen cases,154 the FBI was investigating users of a 
popular child pornography website hosted on the “dark web”155 
within the Tor network.156 The FBI gained control of the site’s 
servers and “relocated the website content to servers in a secure 
government facility” in Virginia.157 Next, in order to identify users, 
who were “still cloaked by the Tor encryption technology,”158 
agents acquired a warrant that permitted them to use malware to 
infect the computers of any “user who logged into the target 
	
 150.  Welch, 811 F.3d at 278. 
 151.  United States v. Cottom, Nos. 8:13CR108, 8:15CR239, 2015 WL 9308226, at *3 (D. 
Neb. Dec. 22, 2015) (describing the technique); Mayer, supra note 1, at 587. 
 152.  United States v. Laurita, No. 8:13CR107, 2016 WL 4179365, at *3 (D. Neb. Aug.  
5, 2016). 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  United States v. Kienast, 907 F.3d 522 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Hammond, 
740 F. App’x 573 (9th Cir. 2018) (Mem.); United States v. Henderson, 906 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 
2018); United States v. Torres, 740 F. App’x 54 (5th Cir. 2018) (Mem.); United States v. 
Randolph, 725 F. App’x 249 (4th Cir. 2018) (Mem.); United States v. Jean, 891 F.3d 712 (8th 
Cir. 2018); United States v. Lough, 721 F. App’x 291 (4th Cir. 2018) (Mem.); United States v. 
Tagg, 886 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2018); United States v. Werdene, 883 F.3d 204 (3rd Cir. 2018); 
United States v. McLamb, 880 F.3d 685 (4th Cir. 2018); United States v. Levin, 874 F.3d 316 
(1st Cir. 2017); United States v. Workman, 863 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir. 2017); United States v. 
Horton, 863 F.3d 1041 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 155.  McLamb, 880 F.3d at 686. 
 156.  Henderson, 906 F.3d at 1111. 
 157.  Horton, 863 F.3d at 1045. 
 158.  Id. 
003.NEWELL_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/17/20 12:39 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2019 
1034 
	
website.”159 The malware infected any computer that logged into 
the Playpen website, causing the users’ computers to transmit 
“seven pieces of identifying information”160 back to the 
government, including: 
(1) the computer’s IP address and the date and time that it was 
determined; (2) a unique identifier to distinguish data from that 
of other computers accessing Playpen; (3) the computer’s 
operating system; (4) information about whether the NIT had 
already been delivered to the computer; (5) the computer’s host 
name; (6) the operating system’s username; and (7) the 
computer’s media access control [MAC] address.161 
Across the Atlantic, the Dutch regulation of police hacking 
regulates the collection of certain characteristics of the computer or 
its user, such as the computer’s location or the user’s identity, as a 
separate functionality of police hacking (considered a digital 
variant of the physical sneak-and-peak operation162). These types of 
searches are subject to less strict procedural requirements than 
remote searches or the deletion of data (functionalities B, C, and F), 
but have the same requirements as hacking to facilitate interception 
or observation (functionalities D and E). 
The use of police hacking for the purpose of locating offenders 
is also discussed in German doctrine, although it is not regulated as 
a separate functionality. Rather, it is discussed as one of the few 
cases where the use of police hacking is justifiable from the 
perspective of the necessity. A number of German scholars are 
critical of the wide scope163 and intrusiveness of the newly 
introduced provisions164 and question the proportionality and 
necessity of the regulation.165 The determination of the location  
of perpetrators who use advanced anonymization technology to 
hide their IP address is recognized as an exception in this sense, 
	
 159.  Randolph, 725 F. App’x at 250. 
 160.  Henderson, 906 F.3d at 1112. 
 161.  United States v. Kienast, 907 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 2018). 
 162.  Kamerstukken II, 2015/16, 34 372, no. 3 at 19 (Neth.). 
 163.  LISA BLECHSCHMITT, STRAFVERFOLGUNG IM DIGITALEN ZEITALTER 361–66, 365 
(2018) (Ger.). 
 164.  See, e.g., Freiling et al., supra note 3, at 19; Roggan, supra note 53, at 827; Michael 
Soiné, Die strafprozessuale Online-Durchsuchung, 38 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STRAFRECHT 497, 
497–504 (2018) (Ger.). 
 165.  Freiling et al., supra note 3, at 19; Roggan, supra note 53, at 828. 
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since it can hardly be pursued otherwise than through the use of 
police hacking.166 
B. Remote Search of Stored Data 
In the United States, as mentioned earlier, there is little doctrine 
or case law directly covering the legality of remote searches of 
stored data using police hacking techniques, although it seems clear 
that these would generally amount to Fourth Amendment searches, 
at least insofar as the search might extend beyond merely acquiring 
non-content data.167 In the FBI’s ill-fated application for a warrant 
in the In re Warrant To Search a Target Computer at Premises 
Unknown168 case, the FBI had sought the ability to remotely search 
the hard drive and RAM of the suspect’s computer. This sort of 
request (or hacking) may be occurring (indeed, it is the specific type 
of functionality addressed in the 2016 changes to Rule 41), but its 
occurrence is not (yet) otherwise apparent in available case law. 
In the promulgation of the 2016 amendments to Rule 41, the 
Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules (which developed the 
amendments), promoted the expanded magistrate powers to 
explicitly authorize “remote access to search electronic storage 
media,” at least in part, as a response and remedy (rather than a 
threat) to the invasion of privacy experienced by computer users 
who had had their computers infected with illegal malware under 
18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(5). The Committee asserted that remote access 
would allow for more efficient investigations of complex computer 
crimes, such as those using botnets.169 
The most common public comments in opposition to the 
proposed rule changes were related to privacy and the Fourth 
Amendment, including comments arguing that remote searches 
would run afoul of the Fourth Amendment’s particularity 
	
 166.  Freiling et al., supra note 3, at 19. 
 167.  Of course, law enforcement resorts to utilizing orders available under the Stored 
Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2713 (2018), as another way for investigators to 
acquire stored communications data, but this process does not involve police hacking. 
 168.  958 F. Supp. 2d 753 (S.D. Tex. 2013). 
 169.  Hon. Reena Raggi, Advisory Comm. on Criminal Rules, Report of the Advisory 
Committee on Criminal Rules, USCOURTS.GOV 9 (May 6, 2015), https://www.uscourts.gov/ 
sites/default/files/2015-05-criminal_rules_report_0.pdf. Notably, however, the amendment 
and supporting documentation do not explicitly authorize law enforcement to disinfect 
computers or otherwise delete data. 
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requirement.170 However, the committee (excepting one dissenting 
member) explicitly defended its changes as procedural, not 
substantive, and thus outside the remit of Fourth Amendment 
concerns.171 The comments in opposition to the changes, in the 
committee’s view, did not consider “the real need for amendment 
to allow the government to respond effectively to the threats posed 
by technology [such as] serious offenses to jeopardize . . . 
individual privacy.”172 The committee was “confident that judges 
will address Fourth Amendment requirements on a case-by-case 
basis both in issuing warrants under these amendments and in 
reviewing them when challenges are made thereafter”173 and that 
“[j]udicial review of warrant applications better ensures Fourth 
Amendment rights and enhances privacy.”174 In response to the 
dissenting view of one member of the committee that, “[f]or many 
people, computers are their lives, and . . . that these privacy 
concerns should be considered in the first instance by Congress,” 
the rest of the committee argued that “computers are no more 
sacrosanct than homes, and search warrants for homes have long 
been issued ex parte and reviewed in back-end litigation.”175 
Subsequently, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 
recommended that the Judicial Conference of the United States (the 
national policy-making body for the U.S. federal courts) adopt the 
amendments as proposed by the advisory committee, only briefly 
noting the privacy-related concerns.176 
Elsewhere, the German regulation of so-called online searches 
in Section 100b of the German CCP includes a widespread and 
rather indefinite permission for law enforcement to intervene and 
collect information from computers. By not limiting the scope of 
data collection to concrete types of data, the regulation potentially 
allows the collection of all types of data, either by making a 
bitstream copy of the discs or enabling complete external control of 
	
 170.  Id. at 11–12. 
 171.  Id. at 9–10, 13–14. 
 172.  Id. at 13. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Id. at 14. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Summary of the Report of the Judicial 
Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, USCOURTS.GOV 26 (Sept. 2015), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/st09-2015_0.pdf. 
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the system.177 The provision enables comprehensive monitoring of 
the use of the computer, including reading the storage media, and 
access to data generated prior to the order allowing the 
investigatory conduct (unlike source telecommunications 
interception) as well as future data generated during the duration 
of the measure.178 However, the measure must always be limited  
to data relevant to the ongoing criminal proceedings and data that 
can be assumed to be evidence-related. Therefore, the 
comprehensive investigation of the whole computer system is 
fundamentally precluded.179 
The measure must also be subsidiary to other investigative 
means and may only be used if other techniques, such as an overt 
search, do not suffice.180 This principle has also been expressed by 
the German Federal Constitutional Court, which stated that overt 
access to such data must take priority over secret infiltration, and it 
must be demonstrated why an overt search does not promise 
success before an online search can be authorized.181 Considering 
this, some authors express confusion as to which gaps in existing 
powers the new regulation is supposed to fill, since in most cases 
access to data is readily available in the context of overt seizure of 
the data carriers. Other than determining locations, discussed in the 
previous section, an application related to full-disk encryption is 
suggested, although the provision itself makes no reference to 
encryption technology.182 Perhaps the main advantage for law 
enforcement, in comparison to overt searches, is the covert 
character of online searches. However, if this is the motivation for 
the new provision, then it is creating a new type of power 
exclusively related to computer investigations that does not  
have an equivalent in traditional searches, since there are no 
comparable provisions to covertly seize objects in the Code of 
Criminal Procedure. 
The newly introduced online search is widely considered the 
most intrusive investigation measure in the German CCP. 
Contemporary computers and smartphones process and store a 
	
 177.  Freiling et al., supra note 3, at 18. 
 178.  Niedernhuber, supra note 35, at 171. 
 179.  Singelnstein & Derin, supra note 48, at 2646–47. 
 180.  Id. at 2647. 
 181.  Freiling et al., supra note 3, at 22. 
 182.  Id. at 19. 
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large variety of data from all walks of life which potentially allow 
secretive creation of comprehensive personality profiles.183 
Recognizing these risks (in the context of preventive police 
powers), the German Constitutional Court considered it 
particularly necessary to protect citizens from such interference. It 
considered existing provisions of the Basic Law, including the 
protection of informational self-determination, the inviolability of 
the home, and the secrecy of communications, but found these 
existing protections insufficient. Therefore, the court interpreted 
the Basic Law, on the basis of the protection of human dignity184 
and the protection of the free development of individual 
personality,185 to protect the (newly created) fundamental right to 
confidentiality and integrity of information technology systems.  
All covert infiltrations of computers with the aim to obtain  
data stored in them must be measured against this standard, which 
places particularly high demands on the justification of  
such interventions.186 
The German Constitutional Court compared the intensity of 
fundamental rights interference of the secret infiltration of 
computer systems to the interference with the inviolability of the 
home.187 Due to this, the legislature designed the procedural 
requirements for online searches to be identical to those of the 
acoustic surveillance of the home.188 Therefore, the integrity and 
confidentiality of computer systems and the inviolability of the 
home are now considered to be of equal importance,189 although 
they remain separate legal goods.190 Thus, online searches are not 
measured against the constitutional standard protecting the 
	
 183.  Singelnstein & Derin, supra note 48, at 2647. 
 184.  GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC LAW] art. 1, translation at https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html (Ger.). 
 185.  GG art. 2. 
 186.  Singelnstein & Derin, supra note 48, at 2647. 
 187.  Freiling et al., supra note 3, at 21. 
 188.  Niedernhuber, supra note 35, at 171. 
 189.  Part of the literature considers the intensity of intervention in cases of police 
hacking to be even higher than cases of acoustic monitoring of the home. See Freiling et al., 
supra note 3, at 18–19; Singelnstein & Derin, supra note 48, at 2647. 
 190.  Legal goods (Rechtsgüter), in German doctrine, are societal values and interests, 
which are recognized as worthy of protection in the legal order due to their utility either for 
individuals or the general public. VOLKER KREY AND ROBERT ESSER, DEUTSCHES STRAFRECHT 
ALLGEMEINER TEIL 7 (W. Kohlhammer 2016) (Ger.). The notion also plays an important role 
in Italian law (bene giuridico) and, to a lesser extent, in Dutch law (rechtsgoed). 
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inviolability of the home (even when the computer system is 
located inside a home) and are not allowed to breach the protection 
of the home by, for example, secretly entering the home to infiltrate 
a computer system.191 
Interestingly, the Dutch regulation of remote computer 
searches, which allows the authorities to secure data stored on the 
computer (in article 126nba of the Dutch CCP), also seems to be 
inspired by the provisions on oral interception inside a dwelling. 
Since the remote search is considered the most privacy-intrusive 
form of remote access, the procedural requirements have been set 
up to be identical to oral interception inside the home.192 However, 
not much specific attention has been paid to the protection of the 
home in the legislative history of article 126nba of the Dutch CCP.193 
Since the safeguards for using legal hacking are high compared to 
most other investigation powers, it apparently is not very relevant 
whether remotely accessed computers are located in a dwelling or 
elsewhere—it is the computer itself that is being protected against 
intrusions through the relatively high safeguards. 
In Italy, digital searches are not clearly regulated in the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, and this applies a fortiori to remote searches, 
which are neither explicitly allowed nor excluded. Measures not 
explicitly regulated are often classified under the generic heading 
of “atypical means of searching for evidence,” which is governed 
by article 189 of the Italian CCP. The primary judgment on using a 
Trojan to covertly copy data from computers dates from 2009, in 
which the Italian Supreme Court held that covertly installing a 
device on a computer to acquire the files stored on it was an atypical 
means of searching for evidence, for which a motivated order from 
the Public Prosecutor suffices; in this case, there was such an order, 
given on the basis of article 234 of the Italian CCP to acquire 
documents (prova documentale).194 According to the Court, the 
secrecy of communications was not at issue because the program 
	
 191.  Niedernhuber, supra note 35, at 171. 
 192.  Kamerstukken II, 2015/16, 34 372, no. 3 at 29 (Neth.). 
 193.  Significantly, the lengthy discussion in the Explanatory Memorandum of the 
protection of constitutional rights in relation to article 126nba of the Dutch CCP, 
Kamerstukken II, 2015/16, 34 372, no. 3 at 50–56 (Neth.), is limited to the general right to 
privacy and the right to secrecy of communications; nothing is said on a possible violation 
of the right to inviolability of the home. 
 194.  Cass., sez. V, 14 ottobre 2009, n. 16556 (It.) (“Virruso”). 
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did not intercept a flow of communications (which implies a 
dialogue with other persons), but merely targeted the 
unidirectional flow of data inside the computer’s circuits.195 
Moreover, the Court did not consider the inviolability of the 
home to be infringed because the computer was located in a public 
office, open to a “community of people that was not particularly 
extensive, but neither limited or a priori determinable on the basis 
of a personal decision by the accused,” and hence not a 
constitutionally protected type of place.196 Thus, unlike in Germany 
and the Netherlands, where the location of the computer does not 
appear to be of importance, computers in Italy appear to be more 
strongly protected when located in constitutionally protected 
places. This has been criticized in the literature: it misunderstands 
the intrinsic place-independence of computers, in relation to the 
(doctrinally constructed) protected legal good of “informatic 
home” or “informatic privacy.” The Court’s argument leads to 
protecting the data contained in a computer when this is located 
inside a home, but not when it is located in public places, 
completely ignoring the factual circumstance that—for instance, 
through accessing the cloud—the subject can in both cases conduct 
in both places activities with the same level of sensitiveness.197 
A considerable number of Italian scholars consider online 
covert searches for data retrieval to be unconstitutional198 for lack 
of specific legal rules stipulating the conditions and modes of 
operation and lack of necessary safeguards to limit the privacy 
infringement to what is necessary.199 Nevertheless, the 2009 
	
 195.  Id.; see also Mauro Trogu, Sorveglianza e “perquisizioni” on-line su materiale 
informatico, in LE INDAGINI ATIPICHE 431, 448 (Adolfo Scalfati ed., Giappichelli Editore, 2014). 
 196.  Trogu, supra note 195, at 448. 
 197.  Giulia Lasagni, L’uso di captatori informatici (trojans) nelle intercettazioni “fra 
presenti”, DIRITTO PENALE CONTEMPORANEO 11–16 (2016), https://www. 
penalecontemporaneo.it/upload/LASAGNI_2016b.pdf; see also Trogu, supra note 195, at 448 
(“[T]he individual who uses his portable personal computer on the public street would lose 
the right to privacy on its contents, thus legitimating any public or private intrusion.”). 
 198.  Note that in the Italian legal system, constitutionality is not ultimately decided by 
the Supreme Court, but by the Constitutional Court. Scholars can therefore argue (on the 
basis of constitutional arguments) that a law, or an interpretation of the law by the Supreme 
Court, would not hold up when challenged before the Constitutional Court. 
 199.  Lasagni, supra note 197, 11–16; Iovene, supra note 24, at 341–42 (2014); Stefano 
Marcolini, Le cosiddette perquisizioni on line (o perquisizioni elettroniche), 7/8 CASSAZIONE 
PENALE 2855, at 2866–67 (2010). 
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judgment was confirmed in the 2012 Bisignani case by the Italian 
Supreme Court.200 Interestingly, the prosecutor requested the 
investigatory judge to authorize an “online search,” alongside an 
authorization for oral interception, both on the basis of article 266 
of the Italian CCP (interception of communications). However, the 
judge had not considered such authorization necessary for the 
online search, as, according to the 2009 judgment, a motivated 
order from the prosecutor would suffice. This was upheld by the 
Supreme Court.201 
C. Remote Monitoring of Computer Use 
Although the legal provisions in some jurisdictions generally 
do not distinguish between a one-off remote search of data stored 
in a computer and longer-term monitoring of computer use, the 
latter is recognized as significantly more intrusive in the literature 
and case law of other jurisdictions. In the United States, ongoing 
searches (e.g., location tracking or wiretapping warrants) must 
typically be explicitly allowed in the legitimating warrant or court 
order. Likewise, police hacking operations that extend 
prospectively for a period of time should also be explicitly 
approved under ongoing warrants.202 Importantly, if the remote 
monitoring encompasses the collection of electronic 
communications content (including the capture of text-based 
communications), police must acquire a “continuously valid super-
warrant” under the federal Wiretap Act203 (this requirement is 
mostly relevant to functionality D, discussed in the following 
section, but would also apply here in appropriate cases). Remote 
monitoring of computer use was also one of the functionalities 
requested by the government in its failed warrant application in In 
re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown.204 
	
 200.  Vaciagio & Ramalho, supra note 36, at 92 (citing  Cass., sez. VI, 27 novembre 2012, 
n. 254865 (It.) (“Bisignani”)). 
 201.  See Lasagni, supra note 197, 11–16 (citing Marco Torre, Il virus di Stato nel diritto 
vivente tra esigenze investigative e tutela dei diritti fondamentali, 9 DIR. PEN. PROC. 1163,  
1167 (2015)). 
 202.  Mayer, supra note 1, at 628–29. 
 203.  Id. at 629; 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–11, 2518. 
 204.  In re Warrant to Search a Target Comput. at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d 
753 (S.D. Tex. 2013). 
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In Germany, some authors point out that the official legal term 
used for police hacking—”online search”—is misleading. Whereas 
a classic search is a one-off, limited measure, from the wording of 
Section 100b of the German CCP it is evident that, by means of the 
“online search,” data may be continuously collected over an 
extended period.205 Consequently, police could access data already 
existing at the time of ordering the measure as well as newly 
created data, including (future) stored emails, text messages, 
photographs, video files, social media contacts, etc. Furthermore, 
the measure can also be used to give law enforcement “live access” 
to data which is only plainly visible on the computer system 
temporarily. This can be compared to secretly glancing over the 
shoulder of the computer user to monitor all their digital 
activities.206 As such, rather than a search, this constitutes 
comprehensive covert surveillance of the computer.207 
Naturally, such collection must be restricted to data relevant to 
the investigation at hand and should be described as precisely as 
possible in the court order to comply with the proportionality 
principle. Truly comprehensive monitoring is not permissible in 
most cases.208 Nevertheless, the online search is a considerably 
more serious violation of fundamental rights than 
telecommunications surveillance or overt searches and seizures 
because it takes place covertly and can extend over a longer period, 
monitoring the entire usage of a computer system.209 Therefore, 
duration contributes to the infringement of fundamental rights. 
Since such monitoring potentially gives law enforcement agents 
access to an extremely large and meaningful set of data, such 
collection places a heavy weight on the personality of the person 
concerned and goes beyond the individual data collections 
protected by the right to informational self-determination.210 The 
German Constitutional Court compares the intensity of an online 
search to the intensity of secret surveillance of the home.211 Yet, the 
surveillance of the home under Section 100c of the German CCP is 
	
 205.  Freiling et al., supra note 3, at 13. 
 206.  Roggan, supra note 53, at 825. 
 207.  Freiling et al., supra note 3, at 13. 
 208.  Id. 
 209.  Roggan, supra note 53, at 826. 
 210.  Id. 
 211.  BVerfG, 1 BvR 966/09, Apr. 20, 2016, Rn. 210 (Ger.). 
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limited to acoustic surveillance, while the diversity and volume of 
data accessed during online searches facilitate more far-reaching 
conclusions about the personality of the affected individual. This 
would make it more comparable to repeated covert home  
searches and monitoring, which are not allowed under the German 
Basic Law.212 
The difference between one-time searches and extended 
monitoring has also been recognized in Italian doctrine. Although 
corresponding powers have not yet been incorporated into 
statutory law, some guidance can be found in existing case law. 
Various authors criticize the lack of statutory regulation, arguing 
that these forms of hacking significantly infringe constitutional 
rights (secrecy of communications, inviolability of the home, 
and/or the right to privacy).213 According to Palmieri, rather than a 
“violation,” it would be more correct to speak of an “attack” on the 
fundamental right to privacy.214 
Discussing a 2009 Italian Supreme Court judgment that 
involved a Trojan that was used to monitor a computer for eight 
months, some authors held that the Trojan at issue did not 
constitute a form of a search because it did not aim to find existing 
information, but also to find future information, which is 
intrinsically different.215 In the 2012 Ryanair case, the police used 
spyware to capture real-time traveler data in an online booking 
system.216 The court found this use of spyware distinguishable from 
traditional search and seizure, which takes place on the basis of 
existing suspicion, as it was targeted at finding new information 
that might lead to a concrete suspicion; this turns the Trojan into an 
exploratory surveillance measure, which, in that respect, is similar 
to interception of communications and is not allowed under current 
law.217 This may suggest that there is a difference between using a 
Trojan to covertly copy existing data (which would be allowed on 
the basis of acquiring documental evidence or, possibly, a search) 
and using it to monitor future data entered into a system (which 
would not be allowed in the absence of specific legal rules for this 
	
 212.  Roggan, supra note 53, at 826. 
 213.  See, e.g., Torre, supra note 14, at 18, 20; Palmieri, supra note 41, at 60. 
 214.  Palmieri, supra note 41, at 60. 
 215.  Iovene, supra note 24, at 339. 
 216.  Torre, supra note 14, at 48. 
 217.  Cass., sez. IV, 17 aprile 2012 n. 19618 (It.) (“Ryanair”). 
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form of surveillance). In the Occhionero case,218 the defense argued 
that a Trojan had been used to capture real-time data on the screen 
or on the device—e.g., by taking screenshots—but not (only) to 
capture data flowing from a computer to the web. The court merely 
ruled that the former might lead to exclusion of evidence, but that 
it is up to the defense to specify which captured data exactly  
are unusable.219 
Although the courts in Italy have been relatively permissive in 
relation to remote searches, authors tend to conclude that 
legislative intervention is required before Trojans can be employed, 
based on what they perceive as the main legal goods at stake. 
According to Trogu, the primary legal good is the “informatic 
home” (which has been conceptualized in law and doctrine on the 
hacking offense220). The informatic home is a constitutionally 
protected virtual space (but also physical space in which the 
informatic data are contained) over which the owner can exercise 
the jus prohibendi (the right to prevent people from entering) and jus 
admittendi (the right to admit people of one’s choice) towards third 
persons, with a legitimate expectation of privacy.221 And since it is 
the informatic home that is at stake, covert remote investigations of 
computers are most similar to making video recordings (of non-
communicative behavior) inside the home, which is not allowed.222 
For a more detailed discussion of the concept of the informatic 
home see infra Section V.B.1. 
Other scholars of Italian law offer further reflection on the legal 
good at issue in remote monitoring. Iovene argues that what is at 
issue is no longer a matter only of data protection or informational 
self-determination, but more fundamentally one of the right to 
personality. It is necessary, she argues, “to protect the informatic 
system as a space in which the individual expresses his personality, 
regardless of the nature of the information entrusted to it.”223 
Finding the concept of informatic home insufficient, she proposes 
	
 218.  Cass., sez. V, 20 ottobre 2017, n. 15512 (It.) (“Occhionero”). 
 219.  Id. at 7–8. 
 220.  See Bert-Jaap Koops, Criminal Investigation and Privacy in Italian Law 17–22 (TILT 
Law & Technology Working Paper Series, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2888422, for a 
brief discussion. 
 221.  Trogu, supra note 195, at 434 (citing Cass., sez. VI, 4 ottobre 1999, n. 3067 (It.)). 
 222.  Trogu, supra note 195, at 447. 
 223.  Iovene, supra note 24, at 334. 
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the concept of informatic privacy to enable controlling what happens 
with information. Thus, it is “informatic privacy” (riservatezza 
informatica) that is the legal good to be protected, which can be 
described as the “exclusive interest, legally recognised, to enjoy, 
dispose, and control the digitized information, processes, systems 
and ‘spaces,’ and their uses.”224 For more on the concept of 
informatic privacy see infra Section V.B.2. 
Torre, seeing that the computer functions nowadays as an 
actual “appendix” of the person and his most fundamental self, 
argues that police hacking enables an infringement of individual 
intimacy that touches upon the inviolability of the mind, and 
therewith triggers human dignity. After all, the real-time 
monitoring that police hacking implies suggests that “what is being 
written in a file and subsequently erased can be captured.”225 Thus, 
it seems that Torre ultimately considers human dignity to be the 
core legal good at issue and recommends treating this as a 
constitutional right associated with proper constitutional 
safeguards to regulate infringements of this right. The Italian focus 
on the protection of individual personality and its free expression226 
and human dignity of the individual227 resembles the German 
constitutional case law in which the right to confidentiality and 
integrity of computer system are held to be an expression of 
precisely these two values. 
D. Intercepting Communications 
1. Intercepting electronic communications (wiretapping) 
One of the most-cited reasons for introducing police hacking 
has been the inability of law enforcement to access the content of 
encrypted communications. The main solution proposed and 
adopted in several jurisdictions is source telecommunications 
	
 224.  Id. at 335 (quoting Roberto Flor, Phishing, identity theft, e identity abuse. Le prospettive 
applicative del diritto penale vigente, 50 RIV. IT. DIR. PROC. PEN. 899 (2007)). 
 225.  Torre, supra note 14, at 87. Also, Palmieri emphasizes that the use of Trojans 
“borders on controlling the mind,” touching upon “opinions and thoughts” rather than 
“actions and behaviors.” Palmieri, supra note 41, at 60–61 (citing Alfredo Gaito & Sandro 
Furfaro, Intercettazioni: esigenze di accertamento e garanzie della riservatezza, in I PRINCIPI EUROPEI 
DEL PROCESSO PENALE 363, 364 (Alfredo Gaito ed., Giuridica Editrice 2016) (It.); PAOLO TONINI 
& CARLOTTA CONTI, IL DIRITTO DELLE PROVE PENALI 482 (Giuffrè Editore 2014) (It.)). 
 226.  Iovene, supra note 24, at 334. 
 227.  Torre, supra note 14, at 87. 
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interception. From a technical point of view, source 
telecommunications interception is also similar to other 
functionalities of police hacking since it also requires secret 
intrusion into the computer system. The difference lies in the scope 
of the collected data.228 
In the United States, the interception of oral, electronic, and 
wire communications is governed by Title III of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968229 (the “Wiretap Act,” codified 
in sections 2710–22 of the U.S. Code), as amended by the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA),230 requiring a “super 
warrant” with heightened application requirements for law 
enforcement. These heightened requirements generally apply to 
(wireless) network interception, keystroke logging, and a variety of 
other forms of interception.231 Congress updated the Wiretap Act in 
1986 to cover electronic communications232 (alongside existing 
regulations for interception of oral and wire communications), 
explicitly doing so as a response to the “development of new 
methods of communication and devices for surveillance” as well as 
dramatic expansion in “the opportunity for such intrusions” and 
“the arbitrary use of Government power to maintain surveillance 
over citizens.”233 The drafting of the legislation was spurred by the 
idea that determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy 
existed in any given case—the Fourth Amendment standard—was 
	
 228.  Singelnstein & Derin, supra note 48, at 2647. 
 229.  Pub. L. No. 90–351, 82 Stat. 197. 
 230.  Pub. L. No. 99–508, 100 Stat. 1848. 
 231.  See Mayer, supra note 1, at 639–40 (citing Joffe v. Google, Inc., 746 F.3d 920, 926–36 
(9th Cir. 2013) (applying the Wiretap Act to wireless network interception); United States v. 
Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 69–85 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that email interception is covered 
under the Wiretap Act); Luis v. Zang, No. 1:11-cv-884, 2013 WL 811816, at *4–9 (S.D. Ohio 
Mar. 5, 2013) (reviewing litigation on keyloggers and concluding that, if malware reports 
keystrokes to a remote party, it implicates the Wiretap Act); Shefts v. Petrakis, No. 10-cv-
1104, 2012 WL 4049484, at *37–44 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 2012) (holding that screen capture 
software that recorded email activity was covered by the Wiretap Act)). 
 232.  The law defines “electronic communication” as “any transfer of signs, signals, 
writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part 
by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects 
interstate or foreign commerce” with some exceptions, including “any wire or oral 
communication” as defined in the same section. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2018). 
 233.  S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1–2 (1986). 
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“not always clear or obvious” in the context of communications 
interception.234 According to the Senate Report on the ECPA, 
[T]remendous advances in telecommunications and computer 
technologies have carried with them comparable technological 
advances in surveillance devices and techniques. Electronic 
hardware making it possible for overzealous law enforcement 
agencies, industrial spies, and private parties to intercept the 
personal or proprietary communications of others are readily 
available in the American market today.235 
Additionally, the Senate reported that the ECPA represented “a 
fair balance between the privacy expectations of American citizens 
and the legitimate needs of law enforcement agencies,” and that 
“[p]rivacy cannot be left to depend solely on physical protection, or 
it will gradually erode as technology advances.”236 As such, 
“Congress must act to protect the privacy of our citizens. If we do 
not, we will promote the gradual erosion of this precious right.”237 
The Wiretap Act covers the collection of the contents of 
communications as they are in transit, as opposed to metadata 
(covered by the Pen/Trap Statute) or the contents of the 
communication after they are relegated to electronic storage 
(covered by Rule 41 or the Stored Communications Act).238 It 
authorizes judges to issue warrants for police interception of wire, 
oral, or electronic communications, with some limitations. 
Specifically, judges may order wiretapping only “within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is sitting” as 
well as “outside that jurisdiction but within the United States in the 
case of a mobile interception device.”239 The definition of “mobile 
interception device” has been met with some disagreement by 
federal courts.240 The Tenth Circuit has held that “mobile 
interception device” refers to a “mobile device for intercepting 
	
 234.  Id. at 4 (quoting a statement made by the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department 
of Justice in response to a letter from Senator Leahy). 
 235.  Id. at 3. 
 236.  Id. at 5. 
 237.  Id. 
 238.  18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–13 (2018). 
 239.  Id. § 2518(3). 
 240.  Michael Koch, If Technology Is the Hare, Is Congress the Tortoise? Split Circuits in the 
Wake of Dahda, 59 B.C. L. REV. 45, 45–46 (2018). Compare United States v. Dahda, 853 F.3d 
1101 (10th Cir. 2017), with United States v. Ramirez, 112 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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communications,”241 while the Seventh Circuit has defined it as “a 
device for intercepting mobile communications.”242 
Because many instances of police hacking involve searches of 
computers in unknown locations, and because communications 
interception is not subject to the expanded venue provisions 
provided for under the 2016 amendments to Rule 41, authorizing 
the interception of communications as part of hacking operations 
becomes complicated. In either case, police applying for an 
interception warrant must know that the target device is within the 
court’s jurisdiction or, in the case of a mobile interception device, at 
least within the United States. And, considering the differing 
definitions of mobile interception device across circuits, it may not 
always be clear whether that provision applies to the mobility of 
the interception device or of the targeted device. Thus, in some 
contexts and in some circuits, it may be difficult (or unlikely) that a 
wiretap warrant could be issued prior to the collection of additional 
information about the target device, including its location. As such, 
these measures might be employed only as a secondary hacking 
technique and only after other functionalities have revealed the 
prerequisite information. 
In Germany, this functionality has been regulated separately as 
a less intrusive form of police hacking. The measure is subsidiary 
to the traditional telecommunications interception and only 
possible when the traditional form of wiretapping along the line is 
not possible.243 It is limited to ongoing communications from the 
time of the order244 and it is neither permissible for the police to 
access communications from before that period nor, for example, 
the content of draft emails or draft messages not yet transmitted.245 
Since it can only be used when traditional interception is not 
possible, it is, in practice, limited to communications that are 
encrypted in transit. By infiltrating the terminal equipment, law 
enforcement can gain access before the communication is 
encrypted or after it has been decrypted by the recipient.246 
	
 241.  Dahda, 853 F.3d at 1114. 
 242.  Ramirez, 112 F.3d at 853. 
 243.  Singelnstein & Derin, supra note 48, at 2648. 
 244.  Niedernhuber, supra note 35, at 170. 
 245.  Singelnstein & Derin, supra note 48, at 2648. 
 246.  Freiling et al., supra note 3, at 10. 
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One of the main reasons why this functionality of police 
hacking is regulated separately in Germany is that the German 
Constitutional Court has exempted ongoing communications from 
the strict regime of protection that applies whenever the 
investigative action infringes upon the right to confidentiality and 
integrity of computers. Access to current communications, even by 
means of police hacking, is protected by Article 10 of the Basic Law, 
which protects the secrecy of communications and can be interfered 
with under less stringent requirements.247 Article 10 is the sole 
fundamental rights standard for source telecommunications 
surveillance. However, technical and legal precautions must ensure 
that monitoring is limited to data from ongoing 
telecommunications processes. And if such restrictions fail, the 
investigative action violates the right to confidentiality and 
integrity of computer systems.248 The reason for excluding ongoing 
telecommunications from the stricter regime is that it is coherent 
with the social function of telecommunications and the 
expectations of users, who make no detailed distinctions  
between traditional telephony and mobile or internet 
communications. Thus, accessing ongoing communications 
through the terminal device can be seen as functionally equivalent 
to traditional forms of interception.249 
In Italy, although source telecommunications interceptions are 
not regulated in statutory law, it appears that they are also 
considered less intrusive, at least in comparison to oral interception 
of communications. In Occhionero, a Trojan had been installed in the 
(fixed) personal computer of the accused, ostensibly to intercept 
telecommunications. The Court found this admissible, pointing  
out that previous case law (Scurato) only concerned oral 
interception, which was considered to be more invasive than 
telecommunication interception.250 
In the Netherlands, unlike in Italy and Germany, police hacking 
to intercept telecommunications is apparently considered equally 
intrusive as hacking for oral interception, given that they are 
	
 247.  Singelnstein & Derin, supra note 48, at 2647. 
 248.  Roggan, supra note 53, at 821–22. 
 249.  Freiling et al., supra note 3, at 21. 
 250.  Cass., sez. V, 20 ottobre 2017, n. 15512 (It.) (citing Cass., sez. un., 28 aprile 2016, n. 
26889 (It.)). 
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regulated together as one functionality of police hacking in article 
126nba(1)(b) of the Dutch CCP. 
2. Intercepting oral communications 
Unlike telecommunications interception, which essentially 
aims to get access to technically mediated (oral or electronic) 
communications, oral interception aims to use the peripheral 
equipment (microphones) of the computer to hear or record 
communications taking place in the environment surrounding the 
device. In the United States, interception of oral communications is 
regulated under the Wiretap Act, described in the previous 
subsection. Under the Act, “‘oral communication’ means any oral 
communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that 
such communication is not subject to interception under 
circumstances justifying such expectation.”251 In other respects, oral 
interception is essentially treated the same as other forms of 
wiretapping and might be accomplished by a variety of technical 
means, although the computer intrusion necessary to deploy 
software capable of activating a device’s microphone might also 
need to be supported by a separate (e.g., Rule 41) warrant 
authorizing a broader search and infiltration of the device. 
In the Netherlands, both telecommunications and oral 
interception are regulated as one functionality. Here, the remote 
access facilitates intercepting electronic communications252 (e.g. 
intercepting Skype conversations or incoming or out-going emails) 
or oral interception253 (e.g., through a keylogging device 
intercepting communication typed on the keyboard or to turn on 
the computer’s microphone). One reason for introducing police 
hacking was that the law previously allowed placing a bug in a 
computer for oral interception purposes, but only by physical 
means (entering a place and installing a bug in the keyboard or 
computer). The law did not include the option of installing a bug 
remotely, which hindered the investigation if the location of the 
computer was unknown or if physical installation was too risky. 
Allowing remote access for this purpose is advantageous because 
it is not necessary to enter a dwelling to install the device, thus 
	
 251.  18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (2018). 
 252.  Art. 126m SV (Neth.). 
 253.  Art. 126l SV (Neth.). 
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avoiding infringement of article 12 of the Dutch Constitution 
(protecting the home).254 It therefore appears that, at least in this 
context, protecting the inviolability of the home is given priority 
over protecting the integrity of computers, since the intrusion into 
computers is considered justified by avoiding infringement of the 
home. However, it may also merely reflect practical considerations, 
such as the ability to conduct the investigation undetected,  
which would be potentially compromised in the case of a  
physical intrusion. 
In Italy, the use of Trojans for intercepting communications—
particularly oral interception through turning on the computer’s 
microphone—has triggered most legal discussion. In Bisignani, the 
investigatory judge authorized this use of Trojans on the basis of 
article 266(2) of the Italian CCP.255 However, since this article 
stipulates that if communications among people present 
(communicazioni tra presenti) take place in homes and places of 
private abode (the places mentioned regarding trespass in article 
614 of the Criminal Code), using Trojans is only allowed if there is 
motivated reason to believe that the criminal activity is taking place 
there. In the 2015 Musumeci case, the Italian Supreme Court found 
that installing spyware on a portable device, which turned on the 
microphone, was a form of oral interception and that this could 
only take place “in clearly circumscribed places, identified at the 
outset, and not wherever the subject might be.” The  
court continued: 
At issue is a technique . . . that presents specific characteristics and 
that adds something with respect to the ordinary potential of 
interception, constituted precisely by the possibility to capture 
conversations between people present not only in a number of 
places, according to the subject’s movements, but—and this 
constitutes the problematic fulcrum of the issue—without 
limitation of place. This is prohibited by the constitutional 
requirements of article 15 Constitution even more so than by the 
current statutory law.256 
	
 254.  Kamerstukken II, 2015/16, 34 372, no. 3 at 13 (Neth.); see also Kamerstukken II, 
2016/17, 34 372, no. 6 at 24 (Neth.). 
 255.  Cass., sez. VI, 27 novembre 2012, n. 254865 (It.). 
 256.  Cass. sez. VI, 26 maggio 2015, n. 27100 (It.). 
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However, this judgment was overturned in 2016 by the Scurato 
decision.257 The court observed that the requirement to specify in 
advance the places where the interception was to take place was 
not required in statutory law nor by ECHR case law. Further, the 
Musumeci judgment had confused the term colloquially used for 
oral interception—namely “environmental interception” 
(intercettazione ambientale), which historically assumes that oral 
interception takes place in a particular environment in which a bug 
is to be placed—with the term that the law actually uses—
interception of “communications between persons present.” The 
first sentence of article 266(2) of the Italian CCP, which states that 
communications between persons present can be intercepted in the 
cases listed in article 266(1), does not contain a requirement to 
specify the place for such interception. It is only in the second 
sentence that protected places are mentioned, but this does not 
constitute a requirement to specify the place of interception 
beforehand as a condition of authorized interception. Rather, it 
exists as a requirement to motivate why it is necessary to install a 
bug in a protected place, for the purposes of specifying how oral 
interception is to be executed. Such necessity is absent in the case 
of interception through “informatic viruses,” which is, irrespective 
of place and by its nature, a form of “itinerant” environmental 
interception.258 
The import of this, according to the United Sections of the 
Supreme Court, is not that oral interception with Trojans in mobile 
devices is allowed, as the Musumeci judgment suggested, when the 
authorization order would describe ex ante the protected places in 
which the interception was (expected) to take place (and the 
motivation that crime takes place there). Rather, such use of a 
Trojan is effectively not allowed at all because there are no 
exceptions to the legislative requirement that oral interception can 
only take place in places of private abode if there is motivated 
reason to believe criminal activity takes place there. The judge 
cannot foresee and predetermine in which places of private abode 
the bugged portable device will be used, making it impossible  
	
 257.  Cass., sez. un., 28 aprile 2016, n. 26889 (It.). 
 258.  Id. § 5. 
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for the judge to effectively supervise that the legal requirement  
be respected.259 
There is, however, a major exception through a law from 
1991,260 applicable in the Scurato case (and not considered in 
Musumeci), which allows for interception under broader conditions 
in investigations concerning organized crime or threat by 
telephone. This law stipulates that in organized-crime 
investigations, oral interception is allowed in protected places even 
if there is no ground to believe that crimes are occurring in such 
places. Therefore, in organized-crime investigations, an indication 
of the places in which interception is to take place is irrelevant.261 
The use of Trojans for oral interception is also the only 
functionality of police hacking that the legislator has taken up and 
is now regulated by statutory law. This suggests that the lawmaker 
considers oral interception, particularly in constitutionally 
protected places (homes and places of private abode), the most 
intrusive usage of police hacking.262 
Article 266(2) of the Italian CCP has been amended to the effect 
that oral interception can also be effected “through the insertion of 
an informatic sensor [captatore informatico] on a mobile electronic 
device. However, if this occurs in the places indicated in article 614 
Criminal Code, the interception is allowed only if there is 
motivated reason to believe that the criminal activity is taking place 
there.”263 For certain serious crimes,264 however, oral interception 
through informatic sensors is always allowed, even in protected 
places without indications of criminal activity.265 The decree 
authorizing the hacking must mention the reasons that make this 
measure necessary, as well as (if the crime is not a listed serious 
	
 259.  Id. § 6. 
 260.  See article 13 of Decreto Legge 13 maggio 1991, n. 152, G.U. Magg. 13, 1991, n. 110 
(It.) on combatting organized crime. 
 261.  Cass., sez. un., 28 aprile 2016, n. 26889, § 7 (It.). 
 262.  In doctrinal literature, however, it is emphasized that other functionalities can also 
be very—equally or perhaps even more—intrusive. See supra text accompanying note 209. 
 263.  Art. 266(2) C.p.p. (It.), as amended by Legge 29 dicembre 2017, n. 216 (effective 
date postponed until March 2019). Art. 614 C.p. (It.) refers to the places protected by art. 14 
Costituzione [Cost.] (It.) (inviolability of the home), namely dwellings, places of private 
abode, and appurtenances. 
 264.  The crimes mentioned in Art. 51, ¶¶ 3-bis, 3-quater, C.p.p. (It.): briefly put, 
conspiracy to, e.g., abduction, illegal immigration, or underage sex trafficking, and  
terrorist crimes. 
 265.  Art. 266-bis, ¶ 2-bis, C.p.p. (It.). 
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crime) “the places and the time, also indirectly determined, in 
relation to which the activation of the microphone is permitted.”266 
These requirements suggest that the oral interception through 
hacking will usually (or only) be possible if combined with other 
investigation measures, such as visual observation or location 
tracking, in order to determine the right moments in which to turn 
the microphone on or off. 
It should be noted that the statutory law only applies to hacking 
mobile devices; hacking fixed devices (such as desktop computers) 
for the purposes of oral interception therefore falls under the 
regime previously determined in case law—in particular the 
Scurato judgment. Consequently, the legal goods considered to be 
most at issue in this stream of law are the secrecy of 
communications (particularly communications between people 
present, which are more strongly protected than 
telecommunications in this context) and the inviolability of the 
home. The latter receives particular emphasis in the fine-grained 
patchwork of situations in which law enforcement is allowed to 
conduct oral interception in protected places (dwellings and places 
of private abode), primarily through a requirement that 
conversations in these places can only be intercepted if there are 
grounds to believe that criminal activity is taking place there. Only 
for certain designated crimes does this limitation not apply. This 
suggests that the home is, in this context, particularly seen as a 
place where people should be able to freely converse and speak 
their minds. 
In Germany, the functionality of oral interception does not 
appear to be permissible. The online search is limited to collection 
of data; using the infiltrated computer system for the independent 
generation of data is inadmissible. Therefore, an independent 
activation of the microphone is not allowed. This can be deduced 
from the wording of section 100b of the German CCP, as well as its 
title (search).267 Furthermore, the literature questions the 
permissibility of using incidental oral interception, for example 
when the connected microphone intercepts conversations without 
being activated by law enforcement. Such interception could meet 
the conditions of acoustic surveillance of the home (subject to the 
	
 266.  Art. 267(1) C.p.p. (It.). 
 267.  Niedernhuber, supra note 35, at 172; Singelnstein & Derin, supra note 48, at 2647. 
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same requirements as the online search), but since the order for 
such measure would not exist in case of incidental interception, it 
will usually not be usable.268 
E. Observation 
Observation encompasses turning on a webcam (or another 
camera) to identify the user or location of a device or to observe 
behavior of the user or people in their environment. In the United 
States, multiple federal appellate courts have held that the 
heightened “super-warrant” requirements outlined in the Wiretap 
Act apply to video surveillance269 (although these requirements 
technically apply by virtue of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Berger v. New York270 rather than as a direct application of the 
Wiretap Act itself271). Thus, in In re Warrant to Search a Target 
Computer at Premises Unknown, the federal magistrate judge 
borrowed the Wiretap Act’s heightened standard to reject a warrant 
application from the government covering the remote activation of 
the target computer’s webcam.272 In that application, the 
government sought to get around the “super-warrant” 
requirements by claiming that they only intended to “snap 
photographs sufficient to identify the persons using the computer,” 
a form of surveillance they described as “photo monitoring, as 
opposed to video surveillance”273 (meaning they would not acquire 
the contents of any oral, wire, or electronic communications). 
	
 268.  Graf, supra note 37, Rn. 55. 
 269.  See United States v. Williams, 124 F.3d 411, 416–20 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 538–42 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 
1433, 1436–46 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 250 (5th Cir. 
1987); United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504, 510–11 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Torres, 
751 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1984); see also In re Warrant to Search a Target Comput. at Premises 
Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d 753, 759–60 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (applying Title III wiretap standards 
for warrant applications to a request for video surveillance). 
 270.  Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58–60 (1967). 
 271.  See Mayer, supra note 1, at 639–40 (“The unanimous conclusion among federal 
appellate courts has been that the Wiretap Act does not apply, but the Berger doctrine does. 
Courts must, consequently, borrow the core super-warrant protections from the Wiretap Act 
when authorizing video surveillance. The result for law enforcement malware is clear 
guidance: if agents seek to enable a computer’s camera, they must obtain a super-warrant  
in advance.”). 
 272.  In re Warrant to Search a Target Comput. at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 
759–60. 
 273.  Id. at 759. 
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However, the magistrate found that, “this [wa]s a distinction 
without a difference. In between snapping photographs, the 
Government w[ould] have [had] real time access to the camera’s 
video feed. That access amount[ed] to video surveillance.”274 
In the Netherlands, systematic observation, where the remote 
access facilitates observation, is regulated in article 126g of the 
Dutch CCP. In contrast to the regular power for systematic 
observation, a technical device (i.e., the software used to infect the 
target’s smartphone) may be placed on a person without their 
consent. An example would be a secretly installed GPS tracker that 
maps the smartphone’s movements with high accuracy.275 
It is relevant to note that the current prohibition of “permanent” 
visual observation in the home remains in place. Since article 
126nba(1)(c) of the Dutch CCP refers to using hacking for the 
purpose of conducting systematic observation as regulated in 
article 126g, the latter’s legal conditions also apply, which include 
prohibition of in-home recordings by installed cameras.276 Thus, 
“permanent observation of what happens inside a dwelling through 
remotely turning on the webcam of, for instance, a smartphone or 
laptop, must be considered equally intrusive as entering a 
dwelling; that is not allowed in the context of criminal 
investigation.”277 As before, the lawmaker here leaves open some 
form of incidental observation inside the dwelling from the outside: 
the prohibition explicitly sees to “permanent” recordings, which 
likely refers to indiscriminate recording of everything over a certain 
period of time. The recording of webcam images for a short period 
might be allowed. Possibly, the real-time watching of webcam 
images—without recording them—might also be allowed if this is 
done with a view to start recording webcam footage when 
something happens that is relevant for the investigation (and 
stopping the recording as soon as the investigation-related activity 
ends). Such real-time observation might be compared with a police 
officer hiding in the bushes and taking snapshots of relevant in-
home activities, which is allowed.278 In any case, using the webcam 
	
 274.  Id. 
 275.  Kamerstukken II, 2015/16, 34 372, no. 3 at 26 (Neth.). 
 276.  Id. 
 277.  Id. at 27 (emphasis added). 
 278.  Kamerstukken II, 1997/98, 25 403, no. 7 at 66 (Neth.). 
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for covertly making in-home recordings over a period of time is  
not allowed. 
In Italy, the norms for video recordings (using spyware to turn 
on the computer’s or phone’s camera) apply according to the 
Musumeci case.279 Briefly put, such use of Trojans is allowed as an 
atypical means of searching for evidence as long as visual 
recordings are made in public places or places exposed to the public 
and not in places of private abode or in situations where personal 
privacy needs to be protected (such as public toilets). Visual 
recordings made in the latter cases have to be excluded from 
evidence.280 Therefore, since visual recordings inside protected 
places are not allowed at all, it can arguably be concluded that, 
despite the Musumeci case, visual observation through Trojans in 
mobile devices is not allowed since it may not be possible to 
determine in advance that they are not located in a protected place. 
Therefore, law enforcement may only infect with malware  
fixed computers in public or publicly accessible places to turn on  
a webcam. 
In Germany, although some authors mention visual 
observation as one of the possibilities enabled by police hacking,281 
most of the literature rejects this view.282 As previously discussed 
with regard to oral interception, German online search provisions 
only allow collection of data but not their active generation by, for 
example, activating the webcam. Even when the camera is 
activated by the users themselves, this would be quite problematic. 
If the user is inside a dwelling, this active generation of data would 
constitute visual surveillance of living space, which is invariably 
unacceptable under the German Basic Law.283 The potential use of 
this functionality would therefore have to be limited to incidental 
cases, such as when the user turns on their camera in a public place. 
Although the functionality of turning on a computer’s webcam 
is minimally discussed in the context of police hacking, the general 
prohibition of visual observation inside the home in several 
jurisdictions (Germany, Italy, Netherlands) suggests an additional 
	
 279.  Cass. sez. VI, 26 maggio 2015, n. 27100, § 3. 
 280.  Id. 
 281.  Beukelmann, supra note 21, at 440. 
 282.  Niedernhuber, supra note 35, at 172; Roggan, supra note 53, at 826; Singelnstein & 
Derin, supra note 48, at 2647. 
 283.  Roggan, supra note 53, at 826. 
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emphasis on protection of the home as a shelter for behavioral 
freedom: people should not feel inhibited to do what they want 
with fear of being observed in the security of their home. The fact 
that visual observation is prohibited, while oral interception is 
allowed (albeit under strict conditions), might suggest that 
behavioral freedom is valued even more highly than the freedom 
to speak one’s mind inside the home. However, this legal 
constellation might also be explained by the generally higher 
relevance of interception for criminal investigation purposes over 
visual observation, so that the balance of interests weighs 
somewhat more towards criminal investigation in the case of in-
home interception, while weighing more towards privacy in the 
case of in-home observation. 
IV. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
In this Article, we are particularly interested in the way in 
which lawmakers and courts assess the intrusiveness of police 
hacking given that this multifunctional new power can impact a 
wide variety of interests and rights. A computer, alone or in 
combination with cloud storage, is a functional equivalent of many 
traditional spaces in which social life is enacted (such as living 
rooms, bedrooms, cafés, libraries, hospital rooms, and public 
squares), and essentially collapses these into a single complex 
digital environment.284 This makes police hacking a power that 
potentially intrudes upon various privacy interests in a manner and 
degree that may resemble traditional offline investigation to greater 
or lesser extents, depending on the functionalities and applications. 
We are particularly interested in examining whether lawmakers 
and courts rely on traditional privacy frameworks in regulating 
police hacking or, alternatively, whether they resort to new privacy 
frames in order to determine its intrusiveness. In this Part, we first 
summarize the classic privacy frameworks that emerged in our 
analysis, and we then focus on new privacy frames that emerge in 
the regulation of police hacking. 
	
 284.  See Bert-Jaap Koops, Privacy Spaces, 121 W. VA. L. REV. 635 (2018). 
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A. Classic Privacy Frames 
During our comparative research, we identified two classic 
privacy frames which are relevant in all five jurisdictions to some 
extent: the inviolability of the home and secrecy of communications. 
Additionally, protection of personal data is a classic framework in 
Italy and Germany, as is protection of a core of privacy in Germany. 
It is also worth mentioning that certain privileged information, 
related, for instance, to legal privilege or the protection of 
journalistic sources, enjoys special protection in most jurisdictions, 
although it is often not regulated specifically in the context of  
police hacking.285 
1. Inviolability of the home 
In the continental jurisdictions (and in the United States286), 
constitutional protection of the inviolability of the home forms a 
key traditional form of privacy protection. The protection is given 
to a spatially delimited sphere which is under control of the 
individual and which can only be intruded upon in a limited set of 
circumstances in which relatively high safeguards have to be met, 
typically requiring a judicial order. It offers container-type 
protection not protecting private life directly but protecting this 
physical space as a proxy for where private life is presumed to  
take place. 
The limitations of such a form of protection to effectively 
protect computers are apparent. One reason is that current 
computers (understood broadly) are not necessarily always kept at 
home and are commonly carried by their users wherever they go. 
Additionally, even computers that typically remain physically 
inside the home are interconnected with other computers. Data are 
also increasingly stored remotely, which makes data susceptible to 
being collected either in transit or at the place of remote storage 
(where protections based on traditional notions of “home” will not 
	
 285.  Protecting privileged information plays an important role in police hacking 
regulation in the UK. See supra Section III(D). 
 286.  See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (“[T]he interior of homes [are] 
the prototypical and hence most commonly litigated area of protected privacy[.]”); United 
States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (“[P]hysical entry of the home is the 
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed[.]”). But see supra 
text accompanying note 169 (advisory committee finding that “computers are no more 
sacrosanct than homes”). 
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typically apply287). The significance of this limitation is moderated 
to some extent in the United States by a similar focus on protecting 
privacy (by proxy) through the protection of closed containers and 
the application of this doctrine to computers.288 But this does not 
apply to the European jurisdictions in our study. 
Therefore, even though commitments to and theories of the 
inviolability of the home potentially offer robust protection for 
private life, our research reveals that its relevance in relation to 
police hacking activities is limited and partial. We can distinguish 
between two principal types of police hacking activities when it 
comes to the importance of home protection: 1) measures using 
covert access to a computer as a tool to monitor behavior in the 
physical space in which it is located and 2) measures targeting the 
computer itself in order to access stored data. The role of home 
protection appears to remain very strong in the first type of police 
hacking, where the police hacking does not target the computer 
itself but rather the physical environment by, for example, turning 
on the microphone or the webcam. The inviolability of the home 
remains the main constitutional standard in relation to these 
functionalities. In the United States, the Fourth Amendment clearly 
covers this form of covert surveillance.289 
Dutch regulation of the functionality of oral interception has 
been justified by the fact that it avoids the need to physically enter 
the home.290 In Italy, communications taking place in homes and 
places of private abode can only be monitored if there is motivated 
	
 287.  This is particularly evident in the provisions of the Stored Communications Act in 
the U.S., which provides a very different (and less restrictive) regulatory regime for access to 
stored communications-related data than, for example, a search of a person’s house for 
communication-related evidence, a search of a smartphone, or the wiretapping of 
communications occurring within a person’s place of residence. 
 288.  See supra references and text accompanying note 131. 
 289.  Indeed, as the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Karo, the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections for the privacy of the home apply to the mere use of tracking 
technology to determine “whether a particular article—or a person, for that matter—is in an 
individual’s home at a particular time[,]” United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1984), 
something the Court noted would “reveal a critical fact about the interior of the premises 
that the Government is extremely interested in knowing and that it could not have otherwise 
obtained without a warrant.” Id. at 715; see also Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (“[O]btaining by sense-
enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not 
otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected 
area’ constitutes a search[.]”) (internal citations omitted). 
 290.  Kamerstukken II, 2015/16, 34 372, no. 3 at 13 (Neth.); see also Kamerstukken II, 
2016/17, 34 372, no. 6 at 24 (Neth.). 
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reason to believe criminal activity is taking place there. Since 
criminal activity cannot be foreseen beforehand and effective 
judicial supervision would be impossible, police hacking for this 
purpose is generally not allowed under existing case law.291 The 
forthcoming statutory regulation of police hacking into mobile 
devices for the purpose of oral interception also suggests that oral 
interception in constitutionally protected places (homes and  
places of private abode) is considered the most intrusive form of 
police hacking.292 
In German doctrine we also found considerations for the 
protection of the home being used as an argument against the 
possibility of using police hacking for oral interceptions.293 The  
U.K. legislation makes no specific provision for the monitoring  
of activity in the home. However, the extent to which equipment 
interference reveals such activity will be considered under  
the proportionality assessment by the authority issuing an 
interference warrant. 
The protection of the home features even more strongly in case 
of visual observation. In the Netherlands, permanent visual 
observation in the home is generally prohibited, which applies also 
to police hacking.294 Similarly, in Italy, use of Trojans to make visual 
recordings of public places is allowed, but monitoring places of 
private abode or in situations where personal privacy needs to be 
protected is not permitted.295 Visual surveillance of dwellings is 
also not permitted under German Basic Law in the criminal 
procedure context.296 In the United States, heightened warrant 
standards would apply to video surveillance inside the home.297 
In contrast, when either data stored on a computer or a user’s 
computer behavior is the target of the investigation (functionalities 
B and C), constitutional home protection appears to be less relevant 
as the standard of protection. An exception is Italy, where case law 
suggests that, in cases of remote access, computers located inside 
	
 291.  Cass., sez. un., 28 aprile 2016, n. 26889, § 6 (It.). 
 292.  Decreto Legislativo 29 dicembre 2017, n.216, G.U. Jan. 11, 2018, n.8 (It.) (the entry 
into effect of which, as observed, was postponed to March 2019); Art. 266, ¶ 2, C.p.p. (It.). 
 293.  Graf, supra note 37, Rn. 55. 
 294.  Kamerstukken II, 2015/16, 34 372, no. 3 at 27 (Neth.) (emphasis added). 
 295.  Cass. sez. VI, 26 maggio 2015, n. 27100, § 3 (It.). 
 296.  Roggan, supra note 53, at 826. 
 297.  See supra Section IV(E). 
003.NEWELL_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/17/20 12:39 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2019 
1062 
	
the home should be protected more strongly than computers 
located elsewhere, such as in public offices that can be accessed  
by a larger number of people.298 However, this has been  
criticized in the literature as misunderstanding the intrinsic place-
independence of computers. Italian authors therefore point to 
different legal goods, such as “informatic home” or “informatic 
privacy,” as the proper yardstick, instead of traditional  
home protection.299 
Explicit place-based distinctions are not found in the German, 
Dutch, U.K., or U.S. regulation of remote computer searches. Dutch, 
U.K., and U.S. safeguards for this form of police hacking are equally 
high regardless of the location of the computer (although, in 
practice, U.S. judges might choose, at their discretion, to apply 
stricter rules for searches conducted within homes than for searches 
conducted in less privacy-sensitive places). The U.K. approach is 
illustrative in that its statutory scheme regulating equipment 
interference corresponds with the place-independent criminal 
offense of hacking, which criminalizes unauthorized access to a 
computer, or any data stored on it, regardless of its place. 
Computers thus appear to be worthy of protection themselves 
and are protected through very high safeguards, thus making home 
protection irrelevant.300 
German provisions on the online search also make no mention 
of home protection. The applicability of home protection to police 
hacking has been examined at some length by the German 
Constitutional Court, identifying significant loopholes in the 
protection offered to computers.301 According to the Constitutional 
Court, the protection of the home applies to both physical 
penetration of the dwelling and to measures by which the state 
agencies obtain an impression of events within the dwelling that 
	
 298.  Trogu, supra note 195, at 448 (quoting cass., sez. V, 14 ottobre 2009, n. 16556 (It.)). 
 299.  See supra Section IV(B) and infra Sections V(B)(1)–(2). 
 300.  See supra Section III(B). Analogies to the constitutional protection of the home are 
found, however, quite often in judicial decisions related to the regulation of police searches 
of digital devices. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014) (“[A] cell phone 
search would typically expose to the government far more than the most exhaustive search 
of a house: A phone not only contains in digital form many sensitive records previously 
found in the home; it also contains a broad array of private information never found in a 
home in any form—unless the phone is.”). 
 301.  BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07, Feb. 27, 2008, Rn. 191 (Ger.), http://www.bverfg.de/ 
e/rs20080227_1bvr037007en.html. 
003.NEWELL_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/17/20 12:39 PM 
997 “My Computer Is My Castle” 
	 1063 
	
are removed from natural perception.302 Thus, police hacking to 
monitor events in the dwelling by using peripherals of the system 
are covered by the constitutional home protection.303 We see the 
same result in the United States.304 However, constitutional 
protection of the home in Germany 
does not . . . confer on the individual any across-the-board 
protection regardless of the access modalities against the 
infiltration of his or her information technology system, even if 
this system is located in a dwelling. The encroachment may take 
place regardless of location, so that space-oriented protection is 
unable to avert the specific endangerment of the information 
technology system. Insofar as the infiltration uses the connection 
of the computer concerned to form a computer network, it leaves 
spatial privacy provided by delimitation of the dwelling 
unaffected. The location of the system is in many cases of no 
interest for the investigation measure, and frequently will not be 
recognizable even for the authority.305 
The latter is an important point for consideration by 
jurisdictions that stick to place-based protection: laws that allow 
police hacking outside the home but not inside the home for certain 
functionalities will be difficult to enforce in practice, due to the 
place-independence of modern computing devices. From the 
legislative documents we studied, in jurisdictions that (for some 
functionality, such as oral interception or visual observation) apply 
a place-based distinction, the law provides very little guidance to 
police as to how they should determine when the hacking takes 
place inside or outside a home (indeed, knowing the location might 
reasonably necessitate some form of a priori police hacking, à la 
functionality A). The most meaningful way to operationalize a 
place-based distinction is to distinguish between fixed computers 
(where non-home-based fixed computers might be hacked under 
lower conditions than in-home fixed computers) and mobile 
computers (where the practical difficulties of determining their 
actual location would imply that mobile computers should not be 
hackable, if home protection is to be respected). 
	
 302.  Id. Rn. 192. 
 303.  Id. Rn. 193. 
 304.  See discussion supra note 287. 
 305.  BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07, Rn. 194. 
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However, as ever more people are using mobile computers 
rather than fixed desktop computers, it will make less sense to base 
protection on computers’ locations. This is where the German 
approach is innovative and seems prescient: it determines the 
intrusiveness of covert online searches not through the lens of home 
protection (even if a hacked computer would happen to be inside a 
home),306 but solely through the lens of the new standard of the 
confidentiality and integrity of computers. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that even though the 
protection of the home does not appear to be a relevant standard of 
protection in cases of covert remote searches in Germany, the 
Netherlands, and the United States (to a great extent, excepting sua 
sponte judicial determinations when reviewing warrant 
applications), it does appear to have served as a role model for the 
level of procedural safeguards that should be put in place. Because 
the German Constitutional Court considers secret infiltration of 
computer systems to be comparably intrusive to acoustic 
surveillance of the home, the legislator designed the procedural 
safeguards for the two measures identically.307 The same is true for 
the Dutch statutory regulation, where oral interception in the 
dwelling and remote computer searches are arguably considered 
equally intrusive by the lawmaker.308 
2. Secrecy of communications 
Most contemporary computers serve, at least in part, as 
communication devices. Computers that can be the target of remote 
police hacking must be in some way connected to other devices 
and, thus, capable of communication. Mobile phones, the most 
commonly used type of personal computing device (at least in the 
United States309), originated primarily as communication devices, 
but have assumed additional computing functions over time. 
In the United States, at least at the federal level, the privacy of 
communications is protected under a variety of statutory regimes, 
	
 306.  Id. Rn. 195. 
 307.  Niedernhuber, supra note 35, at 171. 
 308.  See supra Section IV(B). 
 309.  According to the Pew Research Center, 95% of Americans own some type of 
cellphone (with smartphone ownership at 77%), while 73% own a laptop or desktop 
computer and only 53% own a tablet computer (as of January 10, 2018). Mobile Fact Sheet, 
PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2019), http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/mobile/. 
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with varying levels of protection based on 1) whether police seek 
the content of a communication or only related non-content 
information (metadata); and 2) for searches related to the content of 
communications, whether police seek to intercept the 
communication in transit (wire and electronic communication), 
contemporaneously with oral utterance (oral communication), or 
after evidence of the communication has been saved to electronic 
storage. Contemporaneous (or nearly contemporaneous310) wire, 
oral, and electronic communication is protected against unlawful 
interception by the heightened authorization requirements 
contained within the Wiretap Act, while police access to 
electronically stored communications information is subject to the 
requirements of either Rule 41 or the Stored Communications Act 
(depending on the nature of the proposed search).311 
In most continental European jurisdictions, the constitutional 
protection of the secrecy of communications traditionally protects 
only mediated communications, such as letters, phone calls, or 
various electronic communications. Since it only protects 
information in transit, it essentially protects the communication 
channel itself from interference (interception) or, more precisely, it 
protects the trust of communicating parties in the confidentiality of 
the communication channel.312 Such protection is supposed to avert 
the dangers of spatially distanced communication.313 Thus, the 
standard of secrecy of communications should normally not apply 
to police hacking activities. Because these activities target the 
terminal device itself rather than the communications channel, they 
concern the trust of users in the integrity of their terminal 
equipment and not in the communication channel.314 
However, we observe a departure from the traditional framing 
of secrecy of communications, especially in German law. The 
German Constitutional Court recognizes that the constitutional 
	
 310.  See Mayer, supra note 1, at 640 n.276 (citing Williams v. Stoddard, No. PC 12-3664, 
2015 WL 644200, at *19–30 (R.I. Super. Feb. 11, 2015)) (“Courts have generally not required 
that the transmission of recorded activity be precisely contemporaneous with the activity.”). 
 311.  See supra Section IV(D)(1). 
 312.  Italian law is an exception here, since art. 15 Cost. protects the secrecy “of 
correspondence and of any other form of communications,” which includes non-mediated 
(i.e., oral) conversations. Filippo Donati, Commento all’art. 15, in COMMENTARIO ALLA 
COSTITUZIONE § 2.2 (Raffaele Bifulco, Alfonso Celotto & Marco Olivetti eds., Utet 2006). 
 313.  BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07, Feb. 27, 2008, Rn. 185. (Ger.) 
 314.  Freiling et al., supra note 3, at 20. 
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guarantee of the secrecy of telecommunication protects the non-
physical transmission of information to individual recipients, 
regardless of the method of transmission, but does not protect the 
confidentiality and integrity of computer systems.315 Yet, the Court 
stated that 
insofar as an empowerment is restricted to a state measure by 
means of which the contents and circumstances of the ongoing 
telecommunication are collected in the computer network, or the 
data related thereto is evaluated, the encroachment is to be 
measured against Article 10.1 of the Basic Law [(secrecy of 
communications)] alone. The scope of protection of this 
fundamental right is affected here regardless of whether in 
technical terms the measure targets the transmission channel or 
the terminal used for telecommunication.316 
The protection of secrecy of communications, however, only 
applies to communications in transit; it does not apply to stored 
communications, nor to stored (non-communicative) data that are 
in transit (e.g., access by users to their own data in the cloud).317 
Thus, according to the Constitutional Court, the so-called source 
telecommunications surveillance (functionality D.1) is to be solely 
measured against the standard of constitutional protection of 
secrecy of communications. This implies that access to such 
communications is allowed under less strict safeguards than an 
online search (functionality B), as long as it can be technically 
ensured that access to non-communications data is precluded.318 
In Italy, the secrecy of communications has not been found at 
issue by the Supreme Court when the program does not intercept a 
flow of communications (which implies a dialogue with other 
persons), but merely targets the unidirectional flow of data inside 
the computer’s circuits.319 In the United Kingdom, the interception 
of communications and the acquisition of communications data 
stored on a computer or other device are covered by separate 
regulatory regimes; still, they afford similar levels of protection to 
	
 315.  BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07, Rn. 182-183. 
 316.  Id. Rn. 184. 
 317.  Id. Rn. 185-186. 
 318.  Id. Rn. 190. 
 319.  Trogu, supra note 195, at 448 (referring to Cass., sez. V, 14 ottobre 2009, n. 16556 
(“Virruso”) (It.)). 
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comply with the right to private life under Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
3. Data protection 
Protection of personal data, as used in this section, refers to a 
variety of content-based approaches of privacy protection in our 
jurisdictions. As opposed to the protection of the home (which 
protects the physical place as a container) and the secrecy of 
communications (which traditionally protects the communication 
channel), data protection aims to protect personal data itself as 
something worthy of distinct protection. 
In Germany, this content-based protection is expressed as the 
standard of informational self-determination, which is one 
manifestation of the general right of personality protected in Article 
2 of the German Constitution.320 This manifestation of privacy 
protection confers on the individual, in principle, the power to 
determine for themselves the disclosure and use of their personal 
data.321 As with protections for home and communication, the 
Constitutional Court finds that informational self-determination 
offers insufficient protection to computer users. The Court  
finds that 
[t]he need for protection of the user of an information technology 
system is however not solely restricted to data to be allotted to his 
or her privacy. Such an attribution also frequently depends on the 
context in which the data came about and into which it is brought 
by linking with other data. In many cases, the data itself does not 
reveal what significance it has for the person concerned and 
which it may gain by inclusion in other contexts.322 
A similar argument is advanced in the Italian debate, where 
Iovene determined that article 7 of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (the right to privacy), rather than article 8 (the right to data 
protection), is relevant for protecting informatic privacy: 
At issue is not so much guaranteeing to the affected person the 
control of the ways in which his personal data are processed; 
rather, more fundamentally, protecting the person in a context in 
	
 320.  BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07 Rn. 196. 
 321.  Id. Rn. 198. 
 322.  Id. Rn. 197. 
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which the most varied aspects of his private life are translated into 
data, which are susceptible to informatic processing. In an 
environment in which it is no longer possible to distinguish 
between intimate, reserved, and social data, article 8 of the EU 
Charter turns out to be inapplicable and one should turn to the 
wide protection offered by article 7 to protect private life.323 
In other jurisdictions, we have not encountered the application 
of a data-protection-oriented lens in discussions of police hacking. 
Thus, we conclude that lawmakers and courts do not consider the 
protection of personal data to be a significant normative framework 
by which to evaluate the intrusiveness of police hacking, even  
if personal data are constitutionally protected (e.g., in the  
EU Charter). 
4. Core of Privacy 
An additional privacy frame noted in Germany that does not 
appear to have a comparable analogy in the other jurisdictions we 
examined is the protection of an inviolable core area of private life. 
In its 2016 ruling on the law regulating police hacking in the 
preventive sphere,324 the Constitutional Court paid careful 
attention to the law’s conformity with the protection of the core 
area and eventually declared its provisions unconstitutional. 
Therefore, this privacy frame merits a brief analysis since the Court 
made interesting observations regarding the way the core area 
should be protected when undertaking police hacking. 
The constitutional protection of the core area guarantees a 
highly private sphere that is free from surveillance in order to 
protect human dignity; this sphere consists of inner processes, such 
as impressions and feelings, as well as reflections, views, and 
experiences of a highly personal nature.325 The police are never 
allowed to target this core area of private life. Additionally, the 
protection of the core area must be taken into account on two levels: 
the data collection level, where arrangements must be made to 
exclude unintentional collection as much as possible, and the level 
of subsequent analysis and use of information, where the intrusion 
	
 323.  Iovene, supra note 24, at 338. 
 324.  BVerfG, 1 BvR 966/09, Apr. 20, 2016 (Ger.). 
 325.  Id. Rn. 120-121. 
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into the core area must be strictly minimized.326 Given that covert 
access to computer systems typically carries the risk that 
investigators will collect highly confidential data, the second level 
of protection must be given particular attention. This contrasts with 
surveillance of the home, a difference which the Constitutional 
Court expressed by referring to the specific nature of computer 
systems, where 
protective measures to prevent violations of the core area do not 
aim primarily at preventing the collection and recording of a 
fleeting, highly confidential moment in a private space, but rather 
at preventing the reading of highly confidential information 
within a comprehensive data set of digital information that 
already exists, and that, taken as a whole, is typically not of a 
private nature the way behaviour or communication in a home 
would be. Here, the surveillance does not take place in the form 
of a chronologically ordered occurrence in different locations, but 
rather as access by means of a spy program which, as far as  
the access is concerned, presents only the alternatives of all  
or nothing.327 
As data relevant to the core area cannot be adequately excluded 
during data collection, safeguards must be put in place at the levels 
of analysis and use, such as using an independent examiner to 
screen the information and filter out information relevant to the 
core area prior to making the information available to the 
investigating law enforcement authority.328 
B. New Privacy Frames 
As the previous discussion shows, jurisdictions resort to classic 
privacy frames (in particular, the home and secrecy of 
communications), but the adequacy of these frames in assessing the 
intrusiveness of police hacking is limited to certain functionalities 
(such as visual observation and interception). In an era where 
computers contain so much information that a search of a person’s 
computer could reveal significantly more than a search of a 
person’s home,329 new privacy frames may be needed to assess the 
	
 326.  Id. Rn. 216-217. 
 327.  Id. Rn. 218 . 
 328.  Id. Rn. 220. 
 329.  See supra note 294. 
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intrusiveness of police hacking. Across the jurisdictions, we 
observe the contours of two such new frames emerging: a 
container-based approach focusing on the computer as protection-
worthy in itself and a content-based approach focusing on the data. 
1. Inviolability of the computer 
Since the traditional privacy frames of home, communications, 
and data protection seem no longer sufficient to protect the privacy 
of computer users in the context of police hacking, some 
jurisdictions have taken a new approach: recognizing, explicitly or 
implicitly, that computers are protection-worthy in themselves. 
Thus, a new form of container-based protection, in which the 
computer serves as a proxy for protected privacy values, is 
emerging in several legal systems. 
Importantly, the property-based approach to constitutional 
privacy protections under the Fourth Amendment has long 
regarded “closed containers” as worthy of some protection. In 
more recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the police 
may engage in a Fourth Amendment search when they merely 
touch a suspect’s physical property (including a computer), 
analogizing these physical “closed container” searches to those 
conducted of electronic devices.330 As such, this line of  
reasoning continues the long-running U.S. approach to protecting 
privacy through proxies (often relying on notions of real or 
personal property). 
In Germany, the Constitutional Court found, as early as 2008, 
that the existing constitutional safeguards protecting the 
inviolability of the home, the secrecy of communications, and 
informational self-determination were not sufficient to protect 
individuals against secret infiltration of their computers. The Court 
recognized that the use of computers, their omnipresence and 
centrality in the lives of individuals, and the significance they hold 
for developing individual personalities provides individuals with 
	
 330.  See supra note 131 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 
400, 404–05 (2012) (holding that that the physical placement of a GPS tracking device under 
an automobile’s rear bumper constituted a search for Fourth Amendment purposes, at least 
insofar it as was connected to collecting information about the location of the vehicle,  
as “[t]he Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of  
obtaining information”). 
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many new opportunities, but also presents previously unforeseen 
dangers.331 Consequently, 
a large amount of data can be accessed in the working memory 
and on the storage media of such systems relating to the personal 
circumstances, social contacts and activities of the user. If this data 
is collected and evaluated by third parties, this can be highly 
illuminating as to the personality of the user, and may even make 
it possible to form a [personality] profile.332 
In response, the Court interpreted the articles of the 
Constitution protecting human dignity and the free development 
of personality as encompassing a fundamental right to the 
guarantee of the confidentiality and integrity of information 
technology systems.333 This right protects against encroachments to 
computers insofar as protection is not guaranteed by other 
fundamental rights.334 This fundamental right is not absolute and 
encroachments may be justified for both preventive and criminal 
prosecution purposes, but these encroachments must meet very 
high standards in terms of both the conditions for their 
authorization and other procedural safeguards.335 
Although not as explicit as in Germany, the Dutch regulation 
also seems to find computers as highly protection-worthy in 
themselves within the context of police hacking, since the 
preconditions for covert remote searches are among the strictest in 
the criminal procedure system. These regulations are on par with 
the requirements set for acoustic surveillance inside private 
dwellings. Both Germany and the Netherlands therefore  
recognize a form of sui generis protection of computers in the 
context of police hacking.336 
In Italian law, computer systems are more broadly recognized 
as protection-worthy in themselves, in an attempt to make a 
conceptual connection between the home as a physical space and a 
computer or cyberspace as an informatic equivalent of the home, 
	
 331.  BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07, Feb. 27, 2008, Rn. 170-171 (Ger.). 
 332.  Id. Rn. 178. 
 333.  Id. Rn. 166. 
 334.  Id. Rn. 167. 
 335.  Id. Rn. 207. 
 336.  Such protection of computers (at least in the manifestation of cell-phones) has also 
been recognized in U.S. law, but in a different context, namely search of smartphones 
incident to arrest. See supra note 293. 
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which is a legal good recognized in the law on the offense of 
hacking.337 The informatic home needs to be protected 
as the virtual space (but also physical space in which the 
informatic data are contained) relating to the individual sphere, 
which is also constitutionally protected, over which the owner can 
exercise towards third persons both the jus prohibendi and the jus 
admittendi, with a legitimate expectation of privacy.338 
Torre observes that the concept of the “informatic home” has 
been recognized by the lawmaker as a virtual extension of the 
physical home protection under article 14 of the Italian 
Constitution. This has also been confirmed by the Italian  
Supreme Court:339 
[Although] a notion of home disconnected to spatio-temporal 
coordinates was inconceivable at the time the Constitution was 
drafted, the rationale of the norm of article 14 should today direct 
us not only to protect the physical home, but also and ever more 
towards defending those virtual spaces that represent, by now, a 
fundamental conjugation of the individual’s life.340 
Importantly, Torre argues that the informatic home is even 
more personal and intimate than the traditional home, since the 
latter may contain documents or personal effects, but 
the informatic home, be it a depository of the individual’s work 
activities or of his private life, preserves an extension of our mind 
itself, because the user, ‘working’ with the machine, and inserting 
his own information into it, entrusts to it his work and/or private 
plans, his thoughts, his projects (past, present or future): all those 
data represent traces and expressions of our daily life and of our 
personality; hence, from this perspective, the necessity to protect 
the privacy of the informatic home would prove even more 
relevant and important than the physical home itself, going 
beyond the mere aspect of protecting the privacy of the places of 
	
 337.  See supra text accompanying note 216. 
 338.  Trogu, supra note 195, at 434 (citing Cass., Pen. VI, 4 ottobre 1999, n. 3067, CED 
Cass (It.)). 
 339.  Torre, supra note 14, at 85 (quoting Cass. Pen. V, 26 ottobre 2012, n. 42021). 
 340.  Id. at 85–86. 
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a person’s life, and embracing the protection of the individual’s 
personality itself.341 
According to Iovene, it is now necessary to “reaffirm the 
existence of that sphere of privacy, whose classic boundaries, 
linked to the physical spaces and to the type of information that one 
wants to keep others from knowing, are blurring and 
dissolving.”342 This can be done by recognizing a new legal good, 
worthy of constitutional protection. While the “informatic home” 
seems a good candidate, it is not sufficiently precise since the home 
serves the interest of the jus excludendi alios (the right to exclude 
others) from a preeminently personal or intimate sphere while 
computer systems involve a broader range of activities in which 
people express their personalities and develop social relations 
online or in other “informatic” spaces.343 The concept of  
informatic privacy, which Iovene proposes, will be discussed in the 
following section. 
2. Informatic privacy and the mosaic theory 
In the previous section, we discussed new approaches to 
protecting individuals in the context of covert access to their 
computer. These new approaches attempt to do so by protecting 
the computers or a metaphorical informatic home, as a proxy for 
the values the approaches mean to protect. At the same time, and 
often interconnected with the first approach, we observe a  
second approach, which attempts to protect content itself rather 
than the container, as a proxy for the values both approaches mean 
to safeguard. 
In Italian doctrine, the idea of protection-worthy content is 
expressed as informatic privacy (riservatezza informatica). The 
concept is in a way a critique of the informatic home concept. It 
stresses that computer systems involve a broader range of activities 
in which people express their personalities and develop social 
relations online or in other “informatic” spaces.344 In other words, 
since informatic systems collapse the personal and the social 
	
 341.  Id. at 86 (quoting GIORGIO PICA, DIRITTO PENALE DELLE TECNOLOGIE INFORMATICHE 
66 (1999)). 
 342.  Iovene, supra note 24, at 335. 
 343.  Id.; see also Flor, supra note 47. 
 344.  Iovene, supra note 24, at 335-336. 
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spheres of life, the interest at stake is not so much in protection of 
an informatic “home” so as to enable greater control in the access 
to information, but it is in protection of informatic privacy so as to 
enable controlling what happens with information. Thus, part of 
the Italian doctrine emphasizes that “informatic privacy” is the 
legal good to be protected and can be described as the “exclusive 
interest, legally recognized, to enjoy, dispose, and control the 
digitized information, processes, systems and ‘spaces’, and their 
uses.”345 The focus on what happens with the information—as 
opposed to merely controlling the access to it—is also reflected  
by the German Constitutional Court in the context of core  
area protection.346 
Some Italian authors reach beyond informatic privacy and 
resort to human dignity as the ultimate normative frame to apply 
to police hacking. Torre argues that the computer can now function 
as an actual “appendix” of the person and their most fundamental 
self. With such an understanding, police hacking touches upon the 
inviolability of the mind and thereby triggers considerations of 
human dignity. After all, through real-time monitoring of 
computer use, police hacking implies that police can not only 
acquire finished or stored documents but also expressions that 
people type but may rethink and erase before storing in some 
durable form. Thus, police hacking enables an unprecedented 
perception of people’s thoughts.347 Therefore, it seems that Torre 
ultimately considers human dignity to be the core legal good at 
issue and recommends treating this as a constitutional right 
associated with proper constitutional safeguards. However, his 
argument remains somewhat ambiguous as he subsequently jumps 
from human dignity to “informatic privacy” as the legal good at 
issue in the regulation of police hacking. This may be the case 
because Torre considers this to be more realistically achievable as a 
constitutionally protected right. 
	
 345.  Iovene, supra note 24, at 335 (quoting Flor, supra note 227). 
 346.  See supra Section III(A). 
 347.  Torre, supra note 14, at 87. Similarly, Torre, supra note 201, at 28 observes that the 
“inviolability of the mind” (inviolabilità della psiche) is infringed, if the Trojan captures 
whatever the investigated person writes, also if he decides to immediately delete what he 
has just written. Palmieri also emphasizes that the use of Trojans “borders on controlling the 
mind,” touching upon “opinions and thoughts” rather than “actions and behaviours.” 
Palmieri, supra note 41, at 60–61 (citing TONINI & CONTI, supra note 225, at 482; Gaito & 
Furfaro, supra note 225, at 364). 
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The German protection of the confidentiality and integrity of 
computer systems348 also contains elements of the content type of 
protection. This computer-focused protection is based on the 
observation that computers process a wide variety of data,  
which together can tell a lot about someone without individual 
pieces of data necessarily being privacy-relevant. The Court argued 
as follows: 
In many cases, the data itself does not reveal what significance it 
has for the person concerned and which it may gain by inclusion 
in other contexts. The consequence of this is that, inevitably, not 
only private data is collected by the infiltration of the system, but 
access to all data is facilitated, so that a comprehensive picture of 
the user of the system may emerge.349 
The notion that computers may contain so many and such 
varied data that computer searches can result in highly intrusive 
pictures of people’s private lives leads to an important limitation in 
the scope of the new right to integrity and confidentiality of 
computers. According to the Constitutional Court, 
not all information technology systems which are able to create, 
process or store personal data require the special protection of a 
separate guarantee of personality rights. Insofar as such a system 
by its technical construction only contains data with a partial 
connection to a certain area of life of the person concerned—for 
instance non-networked electronic control systems in household 
appliances—, [sic] state access to the existing data is no different 
in qualitative terms than other data collections. In such a case, the 
protection of the right to informational self-determination is 
sufficient to guarantee the justified interests of the person 
concerned in confidentiality. 
The fundamental right to the guarantee of the integrity and 
confidentiality of information technology systems is to be applied, 
by contrast, if the empowerment to encroach covers systems 
which alone or in their technical networking can contain personal 
data of the person concerned to such a degree and in such a 
diversity that access to the system facilitates insight into 
	
 348.  See supra Section V(B)(1). 
 349.  BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07, Feb. 27, 2008, Rn. 197 (Ger.). 
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significant parts of the life of a person or indeed provides a 
revealing picture of the personality.350 
The Court here recognizes a special status of computers, which 
deserve to be protected not necessarily because they contain bits of 
very intimate data, such as those protected by the core area of 
private life, but because they process a large quantity and diversity 
of data relating to many spheres of life of the user. Even if the 
individual bits of information are not in themselves very revealing, 
putting them together might provide a revealing image of a 
person’s personality and thus constitute a significant intrusion. 
The German Court therefore seems to implicitly recognize a 
mosaic framework resembling the considerations that led to the 
formulation of the so-called mosaic theory in the United States. The 
basic idea of the mosaic theory, particularly in the criminal 
procedure context, is that the aggregation of numerous individual 
data points about a person can, in their composite, reveal 
substantially more about a person than any of the individual pieces 
of data can on their own. The (potential) application of the mosaic 
theory to the regulation of police investigatory conduct in the 
United States has provoked quite a significant response from legal 
scholars in recent years,351 including a number of critical 
responses.352 The theory has, thus far, been influential in some 
recent Supreme Court decisions, most notably United States v. Jones, 
in which Justice Sotomayor expressed concern about the 
implications of police use of GPS tracking technologies: “GPS 
monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s 
public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, 
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”353 
Additionally, Justice Alito, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and 
Kagan, made a similar argument, namely, that the duration of 
surveillance (data collection) and amount of data collected would 
	
 350.  Id. Rn. 202-203. 
 351.  E.g., David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and 
Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 381, 402–11 
(2013); Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a Surveillance 
Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1,  
12–13 (2012). 
 352.  E.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 
315 (2012) (“[A]s a normative matter, courts should reject the mosaic theory.”). 
 353.  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415–16 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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ultimately implicate constitutional privacy concerns, even if the 
initial search would not on its own.354 
The mosaic theory has also featured in Dutch law-making, not 
in the context of police hacking specifically but for digital criminal 
investigations more generally. A committee advising the Dutch 
lawmaker on the regulation of digital investigations in the new 
Code of Criminal Procedure (envisioned to enter into force around 
2024) proposed a general criterion to measure the intrusiveness of 
criminal investigation powers. This criterion builds on an existing 
Dutch standard of so-called “systematicness,” which involves  
the question of whether it is reasonably foreseeable in advance  
that “a more or less complete picture of certain aspects of a person’s 
private life may arise.”355 If so, particular safeguards apply.  
The committee’s advice added a second layer to the standard—
triggering still higher safeguards—of “far-reaching 
systematicness,” which is the case if it is reasonably foreseeable in 
advance that “a far-reaching picture of someone’s life can be 
created.”356 With its emphasis on the image of someone’s private 
life that results from the collection of data, this criterion seems a 
direct application of the mosaic theory. 
To conclude, content-based frameworks to evaluate the 
intrusiveness of police hacking have been used in Italian doctrine 
(the framework of informatic privacy) and German case law (an 
implicit form of the mosaic theory). Although this seems rather 
minimal, it might be useful to focus on the content of computers—
the multitudinous and multifarious data stored and processed in 
computers—as a proxy for privacy protection; this approach could 
be a fruitful alternative or complementary normative framework to 
the container-based approach of protecting computers as the new 
bastion of privacy. The content-based approach of protecting 
	
 354.  Id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he use of longer term GPS monitoring in 
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy. For such offenses, 
society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would not—and 
indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every single 
movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.”). 
 355.  COMMISSIE MODERNISERING OPSPORINGSONDERZOEK IN HET DIGITALE TIJDPERK, 




 356.  Id. at 39. 
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computers’ contents, combined with a mosaic framework, 
resonates with the mosaic theory that emerges more broadly as a 
framework to assess the intrusiveness of investigation powers in a 
digital context, primarily in the context of police location 
tracking,357 but also in the Dutch proposal to formulate more 
broadly a general, mosaic-based criterion for assessing the 
intrusiveness of digital investigations. 
CONCLUSION 
Our analysis has highlighted two different approaches to 
updating legal frameworks to enable an assessment of the 
intrusiveness of investigation powers that is sensitive to the 
specifics of an era in which much (if not all) private life resides in 
data and mobile computers. 
First, a container-based approach uses computers as the 
primary proxy of protection, which can be seen as an extension or 
analogy of the traditional emphasis in legal systems on protecting 
the home as the key container of private life. Particularly, Italian 
law and doctrine provide valuable insights into how computer 
protection can be conceptualized as a new form of home protection, 
in the form of an “informatic home.” Also, German law focuses on 
computer protection, not as an extension of home life but as a new, 
sui generis object of legal protection. Interestingly, U.S. law, with 
its Fourth Amendment doctrine of containers, easily combines 
traditional homes and mobile computers as protection-worthy 
containers of private life. 
Second, a content-based approach uses data as a proxy of 
protection, in the form of a general concept of “informatic privacy” 
(covering all data in digital environments to which individuals 
have, or should have, some form of control in terms of its 
accessibility or use) or in the form of the mosaic theory that applies 
the concept of a mosaic picture constituted by the set of data that 
the police are collecting. 
Both approaches apply proxies: they protect computers or data 
as such, without specifically requiring that a privacy interest is at 
issue. The law can hardly avoid using proxies, since legal protection 
focusing on the underlying interests as such will often be too vague 
to be workable in practice. Investigation officers need some 
	
 357.  See Koops, Newell & Škorvánek, supra note 12, at Section IV(B)(3)(b). 
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guidance about what they can do to collect data, without having to 
make abstract normative evaluations all the time. The core 
challenge for legal systems is to apply proxies that are sufficiently 
workable in practice (hence, concrete enough for investigation 
officers to work with) as well as sufficiently fine-tuned to the 
protected interest (hence, containing sufficient normative thrust as 
to guide the legal interpretation towards the intended type and 
level of protection). 
Using computers as a proxy for protection is attractive because 
it is easy to apply: investigating officers can easily recognize 
computers or smartphones as protected objects, and hence request 
the required authorization before starting to investigate them. 
However, the container-based approach is crude because it treats 
all computing devices alike, whereas the privacy interest can 
diverge significantly depending on the type of computer and the 
way it is used. Many laptops, desktops, and cell-phones will 
contain “the privacies of life,”358 but some laptops and cell-phones 
will contain only relatively few or non-privacy-sensitive data (e.g., 
a cell-phone bought and used only to communicate for some 
particular drug transactions, or a cell-phone used purely for work 
purposes). The container-based approach is also limited in guiding 
the investigation within the container: it is useful to determine the 
conditions for accessing containers, but not to distinguish between 
levels of intrusion of the investigation of their contents. 
Here, the content-based approach appears as another approach 
with roughly mirroring advantages and drawbacks. The content-
based approach offers a more nuanced guidance of the 
investigation of computer data, since it focuses on the types of data 
that are actually (intended to be) investigated and the intrusiveness 
of that data set. The downside of the content-based approach is that 
it is more abstract than the container-based approach, and thus less 
workable in practice. How is an investigation officer to determine 
when a “mosaic picture” arises that triggers specific levels of 
protection? This can be determined by additional proxies, such as 
the number and type of data, the way they are combined, and the 
data’s impact on someone’s private life, but such a list of factors still 
requires a fairly complex assessment that is difficult to perform for 
street-level police officers. 
	
 358.  Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014). 
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Since both approaches have valuable benefits but also 
drawbacks, we think that both frames emerging from our 
analysis—inviolability of computers and informatic 
privacy/mosaic theory—should not be seen as alternatives but as 
complementary frameworks. A combination of both might work 
best to offset the drawbacks of each new framework and to 
capitalize on their combined advantages over traditional 
frameworks that no longer work well to assess the intrusiveness of 
police hacking. 
Some combination of the two frames can be seen in German and 
U.K. law. The German approach is to primarily adopt the container-
based protection of computers but then qualify this protection by 
limiting it to computers that process data in such a way that mosaic 
pictures of individuals’ private lives are likely to arise from the 
investigation of their contents.359 In the United Kingdom, the 
relevant legislation establishes a framework for issuing warrants 
for equipment interference but limits this by a proportionality 
condition that requires consideration of the nature of the material 
sought and the proposed means of obtaining it. Interestingly, the 
combination seems flipped around in Italian doctrine, where 
scholars emphasize that primarily the contents of computers are 
protection-worthy, while recognizing that such protection is 
needed to supplement the dominant spatial approach of protecting 
traditional and “informatic” homes. In their view, protecting 
“informatic privacy” is necessary because computers are more than 
just “informatic homes.”360 “Informatic privacy,” however, remains 
a very general, and therewith abstract, normative frame, which 
lacks the attractive concreteness of designating certain data-carriers 
as containers worthy of protection in themselves. 
We conclude that the container-based approach and the 
contents-based approach can best be seen as two sides of a coin. 
They complement each other in their capacity to serve as a 
yardstick to assess the intrusiveness of police hacking (and, 
perhaps, of criminal investigation powers in digital contexts more 
generally). Choosing one or the other seems unwise: designating 
computers as protection-worthy in themselves (“my computer is 
my castle”) is attractive but crude; focusing on informatic privacy 
	
 359.  See supra Sections V(B)(1)–(2). 
 360.  See supra Section V(B)(2). 
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and/or the mosaic theory makes normative sense but lacks 
practical foothold. We think that a combination of both is likely to 
be the most suitable new framework for evaluating the 
intrusiveness of police hacking. German law goes a long way in this 
direction, but probably still puts too much emphasis on the 
container-based approach. Limiting the investigation of computers 
that process many and diverse personal data and safeguarding the 
core area of private life are helpful to fine-tune the protection of 
what is really protection-worthy. However, the framework lacks 
guidance to assess the intrusiveness of the investigation once 
conditions are fulfilled to enter a protected computer and to guide 
the investigation of the contents. With some supplementary 
protection derived from the contents-based approach, we think the 
German framework could serve as a useful model for other 
countries to apply as a normative frame when regulating police 
hacking. 
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